Started in 2021 with the deployment of men from the paramilitary company Wagner, which has since become Africa Corps, the partnership between Bamako and Moscow seems at its worst since the recent capture of Kidal. The negotiated withdrawal of Russian soldiers is causing tensions within the Malian security apparatus while Russia is trying to save face by increasing communications operations.

Published on: 04/29/2026 - 5:25 p.m. Modified on: 04/30/2026 - 10:35 a.m.

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Four days after the start of the coordinated attacks carried out by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (Jnim) in collaboration with the Tuareg rebellion of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), Mali is in a critical security situation: Kidal, a strategic city in the North, fell, on April 26, into the hands of the attackers, the Minister of Defense Sadio Camara, architect of the rapprochement with Moscow, was killed in a suicide attack while the partnership between the Russia and the ruling junta are faltering.

In the ranks of the Malian army, the episode of the negotiated withdrawal of the men of the Africa Corps from Kidal has left its mark. In a publication on social networks, the Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed that its paramilitaries sent to support the Malian junta had had to withdraw from the city, reconquered in November 2023 with the support of men from the Russian Wagner private militia.

“The Russians betrayed us in Kidal,” a Malian official told RFI, affirming that the governor of the region had warned the Russian mercenaries “three days before the attack, and they did nothing”. An attitude which questions and could accentuate the vulnerability of Malian forces faced with attacks on an unprecedented scale.

“There was already a growth in discontent within the Malian armed forces, especially due to frustrations linked to salary differences – a few hundred dollars for Malian soldiers against several thousand dollars for the Russians – and the lack of operational results and support from Africa Corps on the ground. Several reports also report a contempt of the Russians towards Malian soldiers, even racism”, recalls Djenabou Cissé, specialist in defense issues in the Sahel at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS). According to her, the capture of Kidal constitutes “a snub for Russia”.

However, despite the Kidal episode, trust does not seem to be completely broken between the Malian junta and the Russian authorities. Breaking his silence, the head of the transition Asssimi Goïta called, Tuesday April 28, for a “national surge”. Earlier, he had received the Russian ambassador to the country.

The two sides discussed the current situation, described as "difficult" by the Russian Defense Ministry. The ambassador, Igor Gromyko, "reaffirmed his country's commitment alongside Mali in the fight against terrorism", assuring that Russia would "always be Mali's friend".

The image of a “reliable” partner

According to Wassim Nasr, expert on jihadist movements at France 24, Russia remains involved in the country, believing that the withdrawal of the Northern positions was done for "purely military reasons".

"Faced with attacks throughout the territory, it was impossible to have the necessary support. Furthermore, it is false to say that the capture of Kidal was done without a shot being fired. The Russians fought but they came to the conclusion that they could not hold on", deciphers the journalist, recalling that the Africa Corps fulfilled "its part of the contract" by defending the Bamako airport at the cost of violent fighting.

The rebels' coordinated attacks targeted the capital Bamako on Saturday, as well as the garrison town of Kati and Gao, a former UN base. In total, at least six cities across the country were targeted at the same time.

On social networks, Russia rushed to dispel doubts after its Kidal debacle by publishing spectacular videos of its men in combat. The Kremlin also reactivated the old tricks of its anti-French propaganda, the former colonial power, accusing Paris of wanting to bring down the junta by arming the rebels.

Also read: Jnim-FLA alliance, weakened junta, departure of Russian mercenaries: what is happening in Mali?

“Media campaigns are a way for Moscow to limit reputational effects. The resumption of Kidal in November 2023 constituted to date the only real operational success of the Russian auxiliaries. Its loss shakes the image of Russia as a reliable security partner even though their entire 'brand' is based on this promise of security,” affirms Djenabou Cissé.

According to the experts interviewed by France 24, the bitter failure of Africa Corps weakens the opaque partnership that has linked the Malian junta to Russia since the end of 2021. Having come to power a year earlier thanks to a putsch, the new authorities have made the fight against terrorism their flagship promise. After driving out the French army, the Malian junta formed an alliance with the Wagner group. A private military company founded in 2014, it stood out especially during its years of presence in Mali for its extreme violence and its abuses committed against civilian populations.

After the suspicious death of its founder, businessman Yevgeni Prigojine, in August 2023, the Kremlin is undertaking a vast takeover of all Russian paramilitary companies. Wagner becomes Africa Corps, a structure officially attached to the Russian Ministry of Defense and deployed two years later in Mali. A change of name which is accompanied by a change of strategy, dictated in part by the debacle recorded in Tinzouazène, in the north of Mali, in July 2024. Less focused on striking operations, the new entity, which relies on a contingent of 2,500 men, focuses on the training of the Malian armed forces (FAMa) but without succeeding in stopping the spiral of jihadist violence.

Towards a Russian withdrawal from the North?

Since the summer of 2025, warning shots against a junta at bay have multiplied. After inflicting heavy defeats on the Malian armed forces and their Russian allies, the jihadists demonstrated their power to cause harm in October 2025 by establishing a partial blockade around the capital Bamako.

"The major problem of the Russians is the lack of intelligence. They do not have at all the same means as those of the French army or the American army. The other problem is the lack of aerial vectors necessary to control the immense battlefield. The departure of Western forces has created an almost "no fly zone" above Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, offering enormous freedom of action to jihadist groups, given that the drones acquired by the three countries with Turkish companies are not enough to change the situation,” analyzes Wassim Nasr.

“Moreover, even if Africa Corps is better equipped than Wagner, this remains insufficient in the face of the hostility of this region. Finally, we must not forget that the Russians are a support force. Alone, they cannot defend such an immense territory, but they are capable of defending the junta in power, their primary mission,” he adds.

Since the fall of Kidal, many are now wondering about a possible tactical withdrawal of Russian forces from all northern cities. A sign of the excitement prevailing in the country, the Malian army has abandoned some of its positions in the Gao region, local sources told AFP on Tuesday. Gao is Mali's second military region after the garrison town of Kati, a stronghold of the junta located near Bamako and which was the scene of violent fighting between the army and armed groups.

According to a rebel spokesperson, the coalition now intends to "liberate" Gao, Timbuktu and Menaka and is demanding the departure of the Russians from Mali. "Our objective is for Russia to definitively withdraw from Azawad (northern Mali, Editor's note) and beyond, from all of Mali," Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, passing through Paris, told AFP, assuring that "all the confrontations we have had with the Russians, we have won."

See alsoMali: can power shift?

"Rumours say that the Russians are going to evacuate from the North, particularly from Timbuktu. But once again, if they do, it will be for military reasons, not political ones. Even in the event of withdrawal, the Malian junta will need them even more than before," said Wassim Nasr.

“It is possible that the Russians avoid engaging in operations that are too costly while ensuring a presence in the country in the event of a regime change. A pragmatic posture which corresponds quite well to Russian DNA in Africa based on a risk-benefit calculation,” explains Djenabou Cissé.

"However, the scenario of a total withdrawal cannot entirely be ruled out, given Russian priorities beyond the African continent, particularly in Ukraine. That being said, Moscow has bet heavily on the AES [Alliance of Sahel States] and therefore withdrawing completely would be a real admission of defeat for Russia."

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