Four years after the agreement that ended a war that left hundreds of thousands dead, federal forces and rebels clashed again in northern Ethiopia. The break with Eritrea, tensions with Egypt over the Nile and accusations crossed with Sudan fuel fear that the crisis will go beyond the country's borders. The United States called on the parties to act with "maximum restraint" and resume dialogue.

First modification: 03/10/2026 - 01:55Last modification: 04/10/2026 - 00:01

Four years after the agreement that ended a devastating civil war, Ethiopia is once again facing large-scale fighting in the north of the country. Federal forces are advancing towards Mekelle, the capital of the Tigray region, as a rebel alliance led by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) fights Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government on several fronts.

At first glance, the scenario is reminiscent of the 2020-2022 war, which left hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced. But now the situation is different. Some former allies are enemies, groups that once fought each other have united, and Ethiopia's tensions with Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt threaten to turn the conflict into a regional war.

In recent days, Ethiopia and Eritrea broke diplomatic relations, while Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Cairo (Egypt) expelled each other's diplomats. The Ethiopian government accuses these countries of supporting their adversaries, but they deny it.

Given the escalation, the United States asked Ethiopia and Eritrea to act with "maximum restraint" and resume dialogue to prevent tensions from escalating in the Horn of Africa. He also warned that a conflict in the region would jeopardize the aid that Washington offers to both countries.

What is happening in Ethiopia and why could a new war in Tigray spread beyond its borders?

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What is happening in Tigray?

Tensions between the federal government and the TPLF had been growing for some time. Drone attacks have been reported in Tigray since the beginning of the year, some against schools and humanitarian shipments, and the rebels blamed Addis Ababa. In August, clashes and troop and artillery movements intensified.

The situation escalated in September, when the TPLF joined with six other armed and opposition groups to form the so-called Alliance for Survival, which aims to overthrow Ahmed and establish a transitional government.

On September 23, coalition forces seized all three airports in Tigray and announced a “defensive war.” The fighting then spread to the neighboring Amhara and Afar regions.

The Government responded with the deployment of the Army and allied forces, which advanced rapidly into Tigray. This Friday, October 2, the pro-government Peace Forces of Tigray claimed to have taken Milazat, about 20 kilometers from Mekelle.

In the regional capital, banks and businesses closed due to fear that the fighting would reach the city. A diplomatic source told Reuters that senior TPLF commanders have already left Mekelle, although he warned that a possible takeover of the city would not necessarily end the conflict.

Something similar happened in the previous war when federal forces captured Mekelle just a month after fighting began in 2020, but the TPLF recaptured the city seven months later.

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On the other hand, the new escalation is beginning to have humanitarian consequences.

The NGO Doctors Without Borders reported that the number of wounded treated in the Korem and Alamata hospitals went from about 180 to more than 420 in just 48 hours. In addition, some 150,000 people were displaced, according to a local humanitarian organization cited by the AP agency.

Why did war return if there was a peace agreement?

To understand the current crisis we have to go back to 2020.

The TPLF had for many years been the main force within the coalition that governed Ethiopia. His power began to decline with the arrival of Abiy Ahmed to the Government in 2018 and the relationship between the two finally broke down when Tigray held its own regional elections in 2020, despite the fact that Addis Ababa had postponed the national and regional elections.

The war began in November 2020 and pitted the federal government and its allies against the Tigrin forces for two years. At that time, Eritrea intervened on Abiy's side.

The Pretoria Agreement, signed in November 2022 with the mediation of the African Union (AU), put an end to large-scale fighting, but did not solve many of the problems that had triggered the war.

The disarmament of the TPLF was not complete and hundreds of thousands of displaced people were unable to return to their homes, while territorial disputes between Tigray and Amhara continued. Political reintegration was also not complete: in 2025 the TPLF's legal registration as a party was revoked and the Tigrey region was left out of the June 2026 national elections.

Likewise, alliances also changed. Amhara forces that fought alongside the Government against the TPLF during the previous war are now within the new opposition coalition. At the same time, the Tigrin camp itself is fragmented and former TPLF leaders have abandoned the movement or aligned themselves with Addis Ababa.

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Why did Eritrea go from ally to enemy?

This is probably the most important change compared to 2020.

Ethiopia and Eritrea were enemies for decades. Eritrea became independent in 1993 and both countries fought a border war between 1998 and 2000 that left tens of thousands dead.

However, the relationship changed with the arrival of Abiy. In 2018, the Ethiopian prime minister signed a historic peace agreement with the Eritrean president, Isaias Afwerki, which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize the following year.

When the Tigray war broke out, Eritrean troops fought alongside the Ethiopian Army against the TPLF.

Now the opposite happens. Addis Ababa accuses Eritrea of ​​financing and providing support to the rebels, but Asmara (Eritrea) denies this.

At the center of the new dispute is the Red Sea. Ethiopia became landlocked with the independence of Eritrea and depends on Djibouti for the vast majority of its maritime trade. Abiy said that recovering direct access to the sea is an “existential” issue for his country.

Eritrea fears that Ethiopia will try to take over Assab, one of its main ports, by force, but Abiy denies that he is planning an invasion and assures that he seeks to gain access to the sea through peaceful means.

The tension exploded this week when Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara and expelled ten Eritrean diplomats. Eritrea responded by completely severing diplomatic relations.

Now, the change is complete: the country that helped Abiy fight the TPLF four years ago is designated by its Government as one of the main supporters of that same rebel group.

What does Sudan have to do with it?

Tigray also borders Sudan, a country that since 2023 has been mired in a war between the Army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (FAR). Now the two crises are beginning to intersect.

Ethiopia accuses Sudan of helping its adversaries. The Sudanese Army denies this and, in turn, accuses Addis Ababa of providing support to the FAR, including through training and supplies from Ethiopian territory. Ethiopia also rejects that accusation.

Several diplomats told Reuters that some Tigrin fighters have fought alongside the Sudanese army and that Khartoum, Sudan, hosted meetings that led to the creation of the new Ethiopian rebel alliance.

In addition, Sudan is already the scene of a regional competition. Egypt and Eritrea maintain close ties with the Sudanese Army, while the United Arab Emirates has been accused by United Nations experts of supporting the FAR, something that Abu Dhabi denies.

The danger is that both wars feed each other. A government's adversaries could find weapons, supply routes or refuge on the other side of the border.

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And why does Egypt appear?

The dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia predates this war and revolves mainly around a vital resource for both: water.

Ethiopia built the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, a huge hydroelectric plant that will be inaugurated in 2025. For Addis Ababa, it is a very important infrastructure for the country's development and a vindication of its right to use the waters that cross its territory.

But Egypt has another look. The country depends on the Nile for around 97% of its irrigation and drinking water supply and demands guarantees on the functioning of the dam and the flow it will receive downstream.

Years of negotiations failed to reach a definitive agreement.

US President Donald Trump includes the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia among the eight “wars” that he claims to have ended since his return to the White House in January 2025. In any case, the two countries never confronted each other militarily and the dispute over the Nile remains unresolved.

Now another reason for confrontation appeared. The head of the Ethiopian army accused Eritrea of ​​supporting the TPLF and suggested that its operations would also need support from Egypt and Sudan, although he did not present additional evidence. Both countries rejected any interference.

The tension has already reached the diplomatic field. Ethiopia expelled an Egyptian diplomat this week and Cairo responded in kind.

Can it become a regional war?

For many, that is the main fear.

Ethiopia is at the center of a region in which several crises that until now could be seen separately are beginning to converge.

To the north is Eritrea, which has just broken diplomatic relations with Addis Ababa and has a dispute with Ethiopia over access to the Red Sea. To the west is Sudan, immersed in its own civil war, while Egypt maintains its confrontation with Ethiopia over the Nile and close ties with the Sudanese Army.

Beyond that other actors appear. The United Arab Emirates has strengthened its relationship with Ethiopia and expanded its political, economic and military presence in the Horn of Africa in recent years. Saudi Arabia, for its part, maintains ties with Egypt, Eritrea and the Sudanese army. Added to this is the growing rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

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The Red Sea has also become more strategically important due to the war against Iran, the actions of Yemen's Houthi rebels and concerns over one of the world's main trade routes, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

This does not mean that a regional war is inevitable, but it explains why the situation is more dangerous than a simple repeat of the 2020 conflict.

At that time, the war mainly pitted the federal government and its allies against the Tigray authorities. Four years later, the agreement that was to resolve that confrontation remained incomplete, the former allies changed sides and several regional disputes overlapped around Ethiopia.

With EFE, AP, Reuters and local media

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