A climate of excitement reigns in Bamako, where the junta forces made several arrests after the April 25 attacks carried out by Jnim fighters and its Tuareg independence allies. A repression which could push Malian oppositions to get closer to the jihadist group, according to Wassim Nasr, specialist in jihadist movements in Africa and the Middle East.

Published on: 05/05/2026 - 09:54 Modified on: 05/05/2026 - 09:55

A critical security situation in the North, disappointing support from its allies in the Sahel and a blockade aimed at suffocating the capital Bamako: the Malian junta is facing its most serious challenge since the military led by Assimi Goïta took power by force in 2020.

Since Monday, May 4, the latter has combined his functions as president with those of Minister of Defense, replacing Sadio Camara, killed in a suicide attack at the start of the large-scale offensive by the Jnim jihadists and the Tuareg separatists of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) on April 25.

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Disturbed on a military level, the Malian junta launched a wave of arrests against several active or retired soldiers accused of having helped the rebels. Former Marxist MP Oumar Mariko, an exiled opponent involved in the release of hostages at the hands of Jnim, is also accused of being involved in planning the attacks; while a lawyer critical of the junta, Me Mountaga Tall, was kidnapped by hooded men on Saturday evening in Bamako.

Increased repression which could push certain political opponents to seek an alliance with Jnim to put an end to military power, according to Wassim Nasr, journalist at France 24 and specialist in jihadist movements.

France 24: Since the April 25 offensive, the junta has stepped up its repression, targeting opponents and their relatives in particular who were not linked to the Jnim jihadists. What consequences are there for the Malian political opposition?

Wassim Nasr: The repression had actually started well before. We saw this with the imprisonment of former allies of the junta, such as former Prime Minister Choguel Maïga. But since April 25, the junta has become radicalized. After the death of Sadio Camara, the man who put into music the Russian influence in Mali, Assimi Goïta is really the only master on board.

Its radicalization could reinforce opponents and others to realize that the only way to get rid of the junta is the military option. And in the absence of a third military blow, the only organization capable of doing so is Jnim. There is no clear agreement today on an alternative political project, but by pushing the Malian opposition to its limits, the junta could therefore push them to become more and more in touch with the Jnim.

This would not be the first time that the actions of the junta have pushed actors to overcome their contradictions and their animosity to collaborate. The Jnim and the FLA, who have just carried out the latest attacks together, have a history of animosities and even engaged in violent fighting near the Mauritanian border in April 2024. It is not that old.

Also read: In Mali, a convenient alliance between jihadists and separatists facing “a common enemy”

Have the Malian oppositions expressed themselves on the issue? Could they come to terms with a group that calls for the establishment of Sharia law?

I think everyone is first waiting to see how the situation will turn out on the military front.

For its part, Jnim has already made several appeals to Malian civil society, worker unions, and the military, to encourage them to abandon the junta, to work together on a project to resolve the conflict.

For Jnim, this project will necessarily be inspired by Islamic law but we must see how the different parties will agree on its concrete application, under a less strict or violent regime than that imposed in 2012 by AQIM [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Editor's note]. You should know that Sharia law is already widely practiced in the rural areas of northern Mali – this was already the case even at the time when the French army was present. So there is something customary, not so foreign. The real challenge will be to see how things work in urban areas. In this regard, Kidal will be a real test.

The Jnim appears in a position of strength on the ground. Does the organization nevertheless face political constraints?

The scenario of Jnim entering Bamako with its pick-ups, its motorcycles and its black flags is a fantasy. The population in Bamako is hostile there and its alliance with the FLA also acts as a barrier outside the northern areas. To bring about the fall of the junta, the Jnim is therefore aware that a broader alliance must be found. A broader alliance implies moderation and runs the risk that some of its fighters will leave the organization to join an actor about whom we do not talk much at the moment, but who is well involved in the three-border area: the Islamic State. Remember that the attack on Niamey airport in January was his doing.

The constraint is all the stronger as the Fulani fighters of Jnim, who have paid the heaviest price in fighting with ISIS since 2019, and recently in attacks in the center of the country, such as in Bamako and Kati, have not yet obtained political gains similar to the militants in the North who have retaken their symbolic capital, Kidal. Defections could take place both on ideological issues – for example on abandoning the Al-Qaeda label – and material ones.

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But for the moment, apart from the alliance that was formed with the FLA in the North, there is no political offer from the Malian opposition that clearly includes the Jnim. The latter can wait and continue to play with the blockade of Bamako: the more time passes, the fewer concessions it will have to make in the future. That said, the Coalition of Forces for the Republic, through its spokesperson Étienne Fakaba Sissoko, should make an announcement in the coming hours concerning its project for a new Constitution giving greater place to religion and a new territorial reorganization. Time is clearly on the side of Jnim if the Malians cannot find a political solution to a situation which continues to worsen in the country, but also at the regional level.

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