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Economist André Lara Resende did not imagine that an article he published in his newsletter on the Substack platform, in mid-September, proposing the creation of a new body to manage monetary and fiscal policies, would cause so much uproar months later.
President of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) for eight months in 1998, during the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) and director of the Central Bank (BC) between 1985 and 1986, during the period of José Sarney (MDB), he has seen, for days now, his text guiding the entire discussion about the economic horizon of the fourth term of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT).
The objective, he tells BBC News Brasil, was "to answer why the basic interest rate is extraordinarily high in Brazil and how to escape this trap."
"It does not mean to subscribe to the fact that the country does not have problems with [public] spending and taxation, but they are not the ones creating the problem of the Brazilian fiscal deficit", he concluded in an interview this Wednesday (5/11).
In 2025, the deficit, he cited, was 0.48% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), according to the National Treasury.
In Lara Resende's analysis, the imbalance in Brazilian public accounts is caused more by the high basic interest rate than by government spending itself — contrary to what a significant part of the financial sector points out.
"It's a 'rentier exchange': interest on public debt paid to debt holders who are also the richest part of the population. High interest rates are a factor that concentrates income and wealth."
The relationship between the text published before the first round of the election and reality was not fortuitous: it began when federal deputy Gleisi Hoffmann (PT) shared, last Wednesday (28/10), the article on her social media profile, pointing it out as "fundamental to confront the terrorist offensive on Brazilian fiscal policy".
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Immediately, part of the market began to expect not only that the economist would meet with Lula — who is analyzing names to head his future Ministry of Finance — but that the proposal contained in the text would be carried out. Throughout his current term, the president has emphasized, on several occasions, his dissatisfaction with the country's high basic interest rate, the Selic.
Defined by the Central Bank's Monetary Policy Committee (Copom), it was maintained this week at 13.75% per year — a brake on the cycle of cuts that began in the first half of the year, when it was at 15%.
"I haven't spoken to President Lula, I don't have or had any contact with him, and I don't have anything scheduled [to present the idea to him]. This news was obviously planted to burn the proposal or [harm] someone other than me, because everyone knows that I don't want to go to government — including Lula himself," he states.
"They are burning someone who defended this proposal, an internal fight within the government in which I entered like Judas in the Lord's Prayer."
One of the formulators of the Real Plan, which halted Brazilian hyperinflation during the transition of the 1980s and 1990s, André Lara Resende explains, in this conversation, that the core of his proposal is the creation of the National Fiscal and Monetary Council (CFMN), a body that would work side by side with the Central Bank to formulate long-term goals for the country's fiscal management and the basic interest rate. The council would have the role, above all, of "coordinating expectations" about interest rates and fiscal policy.
To go ahead, however, this plan would need to pass the scrutiny of the National Congress, because the BC does not have institutional autonomy to create its own councils, only consultative committees.
Resende maintains a dialogue with the American economist John Cochrane, a researcher at the Hoover Institution, linked to Stanford University, in California, in the United States, who became known for having constructed an alternative theory to the effects of interest on inflation.
This week, Cochrane published a note, also in a Substack newsletter, qualifying Lara Resende's proposal as "sophisticated", but saying that she adheres more to theoretical precepts than practical ones.
In Brazil, segments of the financial sector as well as those in opposition to the government began to point out that the idea is, in fact, just an attempt to forcibly reduce interest rates, depriving the Central Bank of its autonomy in formulating monetary policy.
They stuck, mainly, to an excerpt from the article in which the economist establishes that, "to begin the new fiscal and monetary regime, the BC would announce the gradual reduction of the basic interest rate, over approximately 12 months, to the potential nominal growth rate plus a transitional security spread of 2%, that is, close to 7.5% per year".
“I have a long tradition of being against tabulations of any kind,” he responds.
"[These numbers] are merely indicative. The trajectory and pace [of the basic interest rate] must be evaluated throughout the implementation of the proposal according to changing circumstances", he continues.
On the other hand, even economists on the left criticized the plan, emphasizing that it would cause capital flight and devalue the real, affecting inflation and, consequently, wages.
In this interview, Lara Resende explores the nuances of her proposal, reflects on the theory of the relationship between interest and inflation and criticizes comparisons made in recent days to her plan, such as the drop in interest rates encouraged in Recep Erdogan's Turkey.
Credit, Senado Agency
BBC News Brasil - What is the indispensable core of your proposal?
André Lara Resende - It assumes that the Brazilian fiscal deficit is mainly due to debt service [public, that is, the interest paid on the debt]. Public debt is high — [corresponds to] around 80% of GDP — but it is not extraordinarily high. What is extraordinarily high is the basic interest rate [the Selic], which is more than double the second highest real interest rate in the world [Brazil's real interest rate is at 8.77%, the highest in the world, according to a projection by consultancy Moneyou. Second in the ranking is Turkey, with 7.77%]. The cost of Brazilian public debt is essentially determined by the basic interest rate, a Central Bank policy instrument that guides the interest structure along the BC's yield curve [the relationship between the interest rate and the maturities of fixed income securities].
The core of the proposal is to answer why the basic interest rate is extraordinarily high in Brazil and how to escape this trap. This does not mean subscribing to the fact that the country does not have problems with [public] spending and taxation. Our fiscal policy has a lot to improve. The spending, for example, is largely patrimonial, demagogic and populist, but it is not this that is creating the problem of Brazil's fiscal deficit.
The primary deficit, which excludes debt service, was one of the smallest in the world in 2025, according to the International Monetary Fund [IMF], and has been that way for many years — with the exception of the pandemic period. It was never more than 1.5% [of GDP]. It ranges from 0.5% to 0.7%. These are empirical evidence.
BBC News Brasil - Why has the Central Bank decided to keep interest rates high, then?
Lara Resende - We come from a tradition of very high interest rates since the Real [Plan] [in 1994]. It made sense back then, when Brazil was experiencing an external strangulation, in which it depended on financing from outside and had just come out of a renegotiation of its external debt. Today Brazil has no external debt. Brazilian public debt is almost entirely carried by residents of the country and is denominated in the national currency. This confusion between internal and external debt, although common, is a big mistake, because the payment of external debt requires the real transfer of resources abroad, but internal debt does not: it is the debt that the State owes to the private sector. It is a domestic redistribution of income and wealth.
BBC News Brasil - The common argument is that high interest rates exist to control inflation that has been caused by high public spending.
Lara Resende - The idea that monetary policy controls inflation through the basic interest rate is highly questionable. The conceptual structure that supported it was dismantled with the changes that meant that, today, all currency is remunerated. The countries' bank reserves are interest-bearing. The distinction between public debt and currency has practically disappeared. Furthermore, the idea that the interest rate would affect inflation — the so-called "transmission mechanisms" — came from the rise in interest rates and the reduction in investment. It has always been known that consumption and investment are not very sensitive to interest rates, but this was the hypothesis: [that rising interest rates] cause a slowdown in the economy, unemployment and moderate wages through the empirical relationship that we, economists, call the "Phillips curve" [the inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation]. But the Phillips curve disappeared all over the world, not just in Brazil.
BBC News Brasil - In what way?
Lara Resende - Because reducing unemployment does not put pressure on inflation. There are several possible reasons for this: the most likely is that formal unemployment has disappeared while the strength of unions has been drastically reduced. The fact is that, without a transmission mechanism, there is no longer any way to explain how the interest rate reduces inflation. This started to be [explained] through expectations.
My proposal is certainly not about interest rate adjustments. I have a long tradition of being against tabulations of any kind. It is about institutional improvement through the creation of a monetary and fiscal policy coordinating body that would establish goals, long-term horizons, above 5 years, for fiscal policy — especially fiscal investment policy — and for monetary policy, that is, for the basic interest rate.
In relation specifically to the interest rate, it would be to say: "the long-term objective, to be achieved as far as possible, which could be two, three years, even longer if circumstances become very complicated, is for the basic interest rate to be set in a range whose floor would be the inflation target and the ceiling, the nominal growth of the economy. To this would be added a "prudence premium", which I suggested there would be 2%, 3% and which, when possible, would disappear. basic interest rate would be lower than nominal GDP growth. This is the condition for stability of the debt and GDP relationship.
With this, we would guarantee fiscal sustainability for the country and, with this, we could reduce the basic interest rate. This is a coordination of expectations necessary to move away from what we call, in macroeconomics, "bad equilibrium": an [economic] equilibrium with high interest rates, to move towards a "good equilibrium", with low interest rates. As this transition can be dangerous if expectations become unmoored, I propose that there be this coordination. So that expectations are not discouraged. That's why it's about institutional improvement.
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BBC News Brazil - Economist John Cochrane, however, wrote that he knows of "no successful historical precedent" for this change and that it "is based more on theory than on policy." What is the practical feasibility of this proposal?
Lara Resende - Have you ever heard of a currency indexed to the URV [Real Unit of Value, which operated the transition from the Cruzeiro Real to the Real in 1994]? Was there any successful experience of this before? Because I was the one who proposed the indexed currency at that time, and you have no idea what the reaction was, how much doubt there was in relation to the URV. It was a political bombardment against [the proposal]. There was also no known experience on how to overcome inflation like the Brazilian one, apart from the experiences of the first half of the 20th century. Obviously, a stabilization policy in a scenario of hyperinflation, of chronic inflation, as it was, is different from the moderate inflation of today.
In fact, we do not have an inflation problem today in Brazil. Our problem is high interest rates. I'm not trying to lower inflation, but rather the interest rate. To do this, expectations need to be coordinated.
BBC News Brasil – In what sense?
Lara Resende - Fiscal policy and monetary policy are intrinsically interconnected, because the central banks' instrument is no longer the quantity of currency [in circulation in the economy], but rather the basic interest rate, which, in turn, directly affects government expenditure. In the case of Brazil, it is the main component of government expenditure or the main component of the deficit. You have to think. [This proposal] requires questioning consolidated teachings and beliefs. Whoever does not think, who does not question, does not advance human knowledge.
Not having previous experience means absolutely nothing. Is there a guarantee that my proposal would work? No. But, well understood and well implemented, it is an institutional advance with a high probability of succeeding.
BBC News Brasil - The market was very attached to an excerpt from the article in which you talk about reducing the Selic rate to 7.5% in 12 months. Would this be done by coordinating expectations?
Lara Resende - The 12 months and the 7.5% rate are merely indicative. The trajectory and pace [of the basic interest rate] must be assessed throughout the implementation of the proposal according to changing circumstances.
BBC News Brasil - Where do you identify the obstacles to the proposal?
Lara Resende - On the possibility that expectations are negative. The terrorism carried out by the press and financial market economists helps to unanchor them. They prevent the Brazilian interest rate from reaching a reasonable level. I am not proposing either capping, or taking negative interest rates or financial repression, but simply taking real interest rates to a level compatible with those in the world — where it is half of that.
The critical point is whether this would lead to an inflationary rebound, unanchoring the exchange rate, with capital outflows and appreciation of the dollar — a transmission channel for inflation in open economy countries. But Brazil has no external debt, no trade deficit — on the contrary, it has a very robust trade surplus, with very solid and balanced external accounts — it has zero external debt, in addition to having US$370 billion in reserves. It would not be an exchange rate fix. The BC would simply announce, to avoid surprises, that it would avoid drastic fluctuations in the exchange rate. He already does this, in fact. He would indicate what exchange rate he considers reasonable, he would not impose it on the market.
In this model, the Central Bank would provide a forward guidance [a public orientation of intentions used by economic bodies] of the two key monetary variables for inflation: the basic interest rate and the exchange rate. It would be a way of coordinating expectations through a medium and long-term announcement of these variables.
BBC News Brasil - You point out that reducing the interest rate would immediately cause inflation to rise until it returned to long-term stability. But wouldn't this initial rise in prices, with the Selic low, end up costing the current economic team their jobs? What would be the acceptable magnitude of this inflation?
Lara Resende - I am the most radical anti-inflation. I am against increasing or making the [inflation] target more flexible, because it is a very serious matter. I thought about this throughout my economics career. There is, in fact, the possibility that the reduction in interest rates could cause a small rebound in the inflation rate. John Cochrane himself says he does his best to explain why reducing interest rates leads to a rise in inflation in the short term. I even think that there is a better way to see this: through the exchange rate. It is possible that, by reducing the interest rate, there will be a devaluation of the exchange rate with inflationary pressure in the short term. This is the fundamental point that must be monitored, in fact. That is why the Central Bank must announce, in a forward guidance, what is the [expected] trajectory for the exchange rate.
But, what I argue is that this rebound would be unlikely in the Brazilian situation, both because Brazil's debt is short-term, especially LFTs [acronym for Financial Treasury Bill, a public security with profitability indexed to the Selic], which would make this effect very weak, and because the country has no external debt and has a good reserve of dollars. The effect on the exchange rate is minimal. What I did, then, was discuss a theoretical possibility of a rebound. Just that.
BBC News Brasil - Would the creation of a council to define monetary and fiscal policies affect the independence of the Central Bank?
Lara Resende - Good question. A serious person asked me, a few days ago, whether there would be a replacement for the Copom. I replied no. I wouldn't change anything. The Central Bank would continue to function exactly as it does today. There would be a coordinating body, a council with long-term policies that would dialogue with the BC, but the bank would maintain the autonomy to implement the long-term monetary and fiscal guidelines that this council would establish. It would also be made up of experts and, of course, the president of the BC would have a seat in this group. Another would be that of the Minister of Finance and, a third, the Secretary of the Treasury. I don't think it's a huge piece of advice: there would need to be two or three more experts.
BBC News Brasil - Would this council have the same institutional level as the Copom or the BC's National Monetary Council (CMN), or would it be more of an advisory committee? In the first case, parliament would need to approve it. In the second, the BC could create it.
Lara Resende - It would have to be created by Congress. It would not be a Central Bank committee, which would continue to be operationally independent. The CFMN would be a body that formulates long-term macroeconomic policies that would be implemented both by the Central Bank (monetary policy) and by the Ministries of Finance and Planning, in the case of fiscal policy. The CMN had sectoral representatives, which is a mistake: the counselors must represent the national interest, not the sectoral ones. Furthermore, if the monetary and fiscal policies implemented were outside the guidelines outlined by the CFMN, these bodies should provide explanations in open letters. Everything needs to be discussed in the relevant forums. I'm just making a suggestion.
BBC News Brasil - Until 2017, public debt had not exceeded 50% of GDP. Since then, however, it has risen 30 percentage points, while the Selic has not remained stable. It fluctuated from times when it was higher to times when it was lowered. If, as you wrote, "the core of the fiscal problem lies in debt service and everything else is secondary", why did the debt grow even when the basic interest rate was not so high?
Lara Resende - The debt grows due to debt service (interest, cost) and the primary deficit. If you add primary deficit with debt service, you have debt growth. The Selic has fluctuated, it's a fact, but it has been extraordinarily high in Brazil. It reached 50% after Real. What is striking is the opposite: how has such a high basic interest rate not caused the debt to explode yet? Look at the situation in Brazil: inflation is relatively contained and the primary deficit is small in global comparison, as it has been in the last 20 years. The interest rate, however, is extraordinarily high. The problem is this: the extraordinarily high interest rate! This is not an endorsement to subscribe to Brazilian fiscal policy, which is bad on both the spending and revenue side.
BBC News Brasil – Furthermore, between 2011 and 2013, the then president of the BC, Alexandre Tombini, began a cycle of falling Selic which, at first, controlled inflation. Just over a year later, however, prices rose again and the agency had to adjust the rate upwards again. What happened in that context that would not happen again now?
Lara Resende - Facts are always subject to how they are reported and interpretations. The fact is, firstly, that Tombini did not reduce interest rates by order of President Dilma Rousseff [PT], as was perceived at the time because of the pressure she exerted. Every president wants to lower interest rates, but thinking this is a total penalty. The idea that the BC reduced interest rates due to political imposition is very serious and generates deep distrust. Tombini didn't do that — and I don't even know him, but I know he didn't do it.
That said, in my opinion, he lowered interest rates correctly because, at that time, after the 2008 financial crisis, there was an extraordinary opportunity for Brazil to escape the high interest trap. What went wrong? The PT government, with Guido Mantega as Finance Minister, thought it was an opportunity to pursue a stupidly Keynesian policy of increasing spending. They "put the brakes on" the spending machine on the public deficit, when, in fact, they should have kept fiscal policy contained and taken the opportunity to lower interest rates. Tombini did the right thing. The Farm, the wrong one. Another exemplary case of the need for coordination of monetary and fiscal policy — the essence of what I am proposing today.
In fact, everyone cites the Tombini case [as a counterpoint to the proposal]. They are lazy and ignorant people. The same thing about [Recep] Erdogan [president of Turkey], which is absurd political voluntarism [comparing] a dictator who imposed a drop in interest rates as if he had something [similar] to what I am intellectually proposing to be debated and analyzed.
BBC News Brasil - And what is your analysis of public spending, the point of contention between market and government?
Lara Resende - They must be rationalized and coherent. The government should cost as little as possible and tax as little as possible. Spending on the public sector and transfers must be fully covered by tax revenue, and we must demand that these accounts are balanced. However, investment spending — and we always have to define what investment spending is, hence the need for a council to do this — would have a separate budget whose funding would not come from revenue. Saying that a company can only invest with its own resources is making it unable to grow. In a credit economy, it is obvious that adopting such a measure would restrict investment. The contemporary world is one of credit theory, although, unfortunately, economic theory still thinks of it as a real economy, where credit and the financial sector are irrelevant. It's very difficult for people to open their minds. They learned like this. It became a dogma. I even understand who defended this in 1950, but doing this in 2026? With the world's financial hypertrophy — and just look at the proportion of financial assets in relation to income? It doesn't make sense. Even [British magazine] The Economist, conservative and increasingly dumb, recognized this. Today's world is not one of income, but of wealth, of capital gains. Financial wealth today is the expansion of credit, rights to human productivity, which are not inflationary because they do not immediately turn into expenses.
BBC News Brasil - Have you spoken to members of the government about adopting the proposal?
Lara Resende - Obviously not. That [PT federal deputy] Gleisi Hoffmann liked what I'm proposing... Naturally, a lot of people liked it, in the same way that it's almost unanimous that those who didn't like it were the financial system and its representatives in the mainstream media. As far as I know, the vast majority of other people liked it. It doesn't mean that they don't think there are no risks, that it should be implemented — I think so, but I'm also cautious. Cochrane said this: that he doesn't know Brazil, but that the proposal is intelligent, despite the necessary caution.
I haven't spoken to President Lula, I don't have nor had any contact with him, nor do I have anything scheduled [to present the idea to him]. This news was obviously planted to burn the proposal or [harm] someone other than me, because everyone knows that I don't want to go to government — including Lula himself. They are burning someone who defended this proposal, an internal fight within the government in which I entered like Judas in the Lord's Prayer.
BBC News Brasil - Do you see any way to change the direction of interest rates within the current model or would this only be possible with a profound change?
Lara Resende - I don't think my proposal has anything to do with profound change. It is just an institutional improvement with unanimous support from intelligent people, starting with John Cochrane himself. As a colleague told me: only fools would be against a proposal to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies through a council. There's nothing revolutionary or dramatic about it.
Now, it is obvious that convergence towards a good balance between monetary and fiscal policy requires institutional credibility, which is low in Brazil at the moment. This would need to be resolved. When I was proposing this, I considered that it might not even be the best time [to implement it]. It would make things much easier if the government presented a coherent, objective and credible fiscal consolidation project. Cochrane, in his response to my article, made an observation typical of an ultra-liberal as he is — completely incredulous in state action: that the State will always talk about rationalization [of public spending]. I also disbelieve in the State, but, unlike him [Cochrane], I didn't give up. I am a hopeful skeptic: I hope that the State can be intelligent, efficient and that it defends the public good, and not corporate, personalist and patrimonial interests, as it has been in Brazil and around the world.
BBC News Brasil - But, returning to the initial point of the conversation, how would it be possible to coordinate these expectations if you point out both that the financial sector does not agree in advance with the proposal, justifying itself by the argument of excessive spending, and that there is a lot of institutional distrust for the State to promote some type of change in interest rates?
Lara Resende - The gradual and announced reduction of the basic interest rate to a range where it was lower than the economy's growth would guarantee the convergence of the relationship between debt and GDP. The interest differential in relation to abroad would remain very attractive, and the "fiscal and political risk" of a default [non-payment of the debt] would be eliminated. This is a much superior alternative for the rentier market itself, which would have smaller but more sustainable gains.
Furthermore, if Brazil's primary deficit is one of the smallest in the world, why is it said that it spends a lot? It is factually wrong. It doesn't spend much.
BBC News Brasil - The basis of the argument, in this case, is the increase in debt itself.
Lara Resende - But the debt rose not because the government spends a lot, but because debt service, that is, high interest rates, made it grow. What can be said is that the government, despite having a small primary deficit, spends very poorly. Then I totally agree. Furthermore, it can be said that the government, in order to have a small deficit while spending poorly, taxes excessively. It's true: the tax burden can be improved, because it is confusing and distorting. But it has nothing to do with saying that the government spends a lot. Where would we cut spending? Transfer costs, for example, are high worldwide, but they are necessary. Right and left defend Bolsa Família in Brazil. In fact, the absurd expense that unbalances the country's public accounts is the "rentista grant": interest on the public debt paid to debt holders who are also the richest part of the population. High interest rates are a factor that concentrates income and wealth.
BBC News Brasil - Is this partly explained by the maintenance of high interest rates? The ability to concentrate income?
Lara Resende - No. It is the concentration of income and wealth that is a consequence of high interest rates. It can be said that interest rates are also high due to pressure from those who benefit from them. But it goes beyond direct interests: it involves ignorance, dogmatism and a poor understanding of macroeconomics, monetary and financial policy. It's a combination of specific interests and ignorance.
BBC News Brasil - You also write that the trajectory of the debt/GDP ratio is on an unsustainable path. Without change, what should happen in the medium term?
Lara Resende - The sustainability of this depends a lot on how many people want to believe that the bubble won't burst, but, like every financial bubble, it bursts by surprise, and then comes a crash. That's the danger. Everything seems to be right, that there will be no problem, and it continues to grow until the moment when people realize that it is unsustainable. Then there's the crash. The current financial hypertrophy will be considered unsustainable and, at some point, a crash will come. But it is not a specific Brazilian phenomenon. It is happening all over the world, because this financial hypertrophy is the counterpart of the hypertrophy of public debt. At some point it will have to be corrected.
BBC News Brasil - Is there anything left open in the Real Plan that helps to understand this scenario now?
Lara Resende — The Real Plan was extraordinary, but it passed. He forgets. Let's not go back to it. This bothers me. What is worth saying is that the interest rate, at that time, when Brazil was emerging from the renegotiation of its external debt, from a moratorium, was a reaction to a situation completely different from the current one. When the URV changed to the Real and we decided to let the currency float [in relation to the dollar], the very high basic interest rate was fundamental, close to 50%, to anchor the credibility of the new currency. Months later, US$1 was worth something like 83 cents of real. There was a justification. This was consolidated some ten years later, when the Central Bank's target system was established.
At that time, the basic interest rate should have already been brought to reasonable levels internationally. If it wasn't done there, it's time to make that adjustment now.
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