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Taiwan will hold local elections at the end of November to elect municipal mayors, county mayors, and county and city councilors.
The growth and decline of the two major parties, blue and green, in local governance has attracted much attention. It is generally believed that the core supporters of the Kuomintang are concentrated in the northern region, while the DPP has a deeper support base in the south.
However, due to changes in population structure, industrial development and political environment, this long-standing political map has gradually loosened. The election results in recent years have shown that the "blue in the north and green in the south" is not static.
BBC Chinese interviewed a number of political scientists to analyze the causes and variables of the "basic" of Taiwan's electoral politics, and how the flow of median voters will affect the overall situation in this local election.
Zhuoshui Creek—Taiwan’s political dividing line
The so-called "party base" or "party sector" is often mentioned in Taiwan's electoral politics. It usually refers to a considerable proportion of voters in a constituency who have formed a stable party identity and have roughly decided who they support before voting.
Judging from the results of local chief elections in the past 20 years, there are obvious regional differences in the ruling territories of the two major political parties. Most of the counties and cities governed by the Democratic Progressive Party are concentrated in the south, while the Kuomintang has advantages in the north and some central regions.
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This phenomenon is often summarized as "blue in the north and green in the south." Traditional political discourse often uses the "Zhuoshui River" in central Taiwan as a symbolic political dividing line, especially in local elections.
In the previous local election in 2022, the Kuomintang won 14 of the 22 county and city chief seats, while the DPP won 5 seats. Its ruling counties and cities were mainly concentrated in the southern region.
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after democratization
Taiwan lifted its 38-year martial law in 1987 and completed democratic reforms such as comprehensive re-election of Congress and direct presidential election in the 1990s. Looking back at history, northern Taiwan, which is today regarded as the dominant constituency of the Kuomintang, had a different appearance in the early days of democratization.
Wang Hongen, a professor of politics at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, told BBC Chinese that in the early days after Taiwan lifted martial law in the 1980s and 1990s, supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party were actually mainly concentrated in "urban areas", including Taipei, Kaohsiung, Taichung and Hsinchu, rather than in the southern advantageous areas currently considered.
He analyzed that before the lifting of martial law, most political positions were held by members of the Kuomintang. When the Democratic Progressive Party and people outside the party promoted the democratization movement in the 1980s, they first launched in cities and gained more support.
"These areas have a relatively large population of highly educated young people, many of whom have left their hometowns to study or work. They are relatively less affected by traditional local political networks and are more receptive to demands for democratic reform."
For example, in the 1989 county mayor election, the Democratic Progressive Party won Taipei County (now New Taipei City), Hsinchu County and Yilan County in the northern region.
This is the first large-scale local chief election since Taiwan lifted martial law. It is also the first time that the Democratic Progressive Party, established in 1986, has participated in a large-scale competition for local governance.
In the first municipal mayor election in 1994, Chen Shui-bian from the Democratic Progressive Party was elected mayor of Taipei, while Wu Dunyi from the Kuomintang was elected mayor of Kaohsiung. During the county and mayor elections in 1997, the DPP's local governing territory further expanded, gaining power in many counties and cities in central and northern China.
The ethnic politics behind "Blue in the North and Green in the South"
So, how did the political landscape of "Blue in the North and Green in the South" come into being?
Multiple studies have pointed out that after Taiwan's democratization, provincial citizenship, national identity, and independence have become the main variables affecting voting. They are also considered to be one of the backgrounds for the formation of Taiwan's "blue in the north and green in the south" political landscape.
In the late 1980s, the discussion of the "four major ethnic groups" of "Hoklo, Hakka, provincial, and aboriginal" gradually took shape, and ethnic factors gradually became the focus of attack and defense in electoral politics.
Wang Fuchang, a researcher at Taiwan's Academia Sinica, once told BBC Chinese that with the process of democratization, competition and opposition between politicians from the province and from other provinces have become more open. Some politicians from other provinces resorted to electoral mobilization with a sense of ethnic crisis, prompting many people to gradually form a distinct ethnic political consciousness.
The people from other provinces who immigrated to Taiwan after 1949 and their descendants account for about 12% of the total population. They are more concentrated in the northern region and have formed a social network and political tradition with a deep relationship with the Kuomintang.
This kind of political mobilization based on ethnic identity was particularly evident during the rise of the New Party in the 1990s. A new party formed by some KMT political stars from other provinces who quit the party quickly sprang up with Taipei City as its main stronghold.
During the 1994 Taipei mayoral election, New Party candidate Zhao Shaokang used the "War to Defend the Republic of China" as the main theme to mobilize voters, and once declared that "if Chen Shui-bian is elected, people from other provinces will jump into the sea," thereby arousing a sense of crisis among some voters from other provinces.
In the 2000 presidential election, Taiwan's political parties changed for the first time. Chen Shui-bian used "Son of Taiwan" as the main theme of his campaign and appealed to local identity. Related arguments gained widespread support among some voters from the province, and obtained 40 to 50 percent of the vote in major southern counties and cities.
According to post-election polls by Taiwan media TVBS, until the 2012 presidential election, about 80% of people from other provinces still voted for KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou. Only about 10% of voters from other provinces are willing to vote for DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen.
However, after this election, there have been no public polls in Taiwan to reveal ethnic background and voting orientation. Some people think this shows the dilution of ethnic politics in Taiwan.
Why do economic factors deepen the divide between North and South?
Lin Zonghong, a researcher at the Institute of Sociology of Academia Sinica in Taiwan, told BBC Chinese that the "blue in the north and green in the south" gradually took shape around the 2004 presidential election, and became an important feature of Taiwan's electoral politics in the following ten years.
He believes that factors such as industrial structure, economic development and regional resource allocation are the key backgrounds that promote the formation of this territory.
Taiwan experienced rapid industrialization and export-oriented economic growth from the 1950s to the 1980s, becoming one of the "Four Asian Tigers" alongside Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea.
However, after 2000, Taiwan's economic growth slowed down, and in 2001, it experienced negative growth for the first time since the war. Issues such as unemployment, wage stagnation, and uneven regional development have gradually become the focus of voters. The industrial structure and development conditions of different regions are beginning to be reflected in political support tendencies.
From the 2000s to the mid-2010s, there were obvious differences in the industrial structure between the north and the south of Taiwan. The north is dominated by high-tech industries and knowledge-intensive service industries, while the south relies more on traditional manufacturing, heavy industry and agricultural development.
In 2010, the service industry accounted for nearly 63% of Taiwan's GDP, and was highly concentrated in the northern metropolitan area. In the same year, the annual output value of the Hsinchu Science Park exceeded one trillion yuan, accounting for approximately 7% of that year's GDP.
From 2004 to 2012, cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges expanded rapidly, and cross-Strait relations gradually became the focus of electoral offense and defense.
In the 2008 presidential election, Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou focused on improving cross-strait relations and promoting economic and trade opening. He received more than 60% of the votes in most northern counties and cities, and even exceeded 70% in some areas.
Lin Zonghong analyzed that in regions with deep economic connections with China, especially in the northern regions where high-tech and export-oriented industries are concentrated, voters tend to pay more attention to the impact of cross-strait relations on economic development and are therefore relatively inclined to support the KMT.
"From the 1990s to the early 2000s, some urban middle classes were an important support force for the Democratic Progressive Party. However, as cross-strait economic and trade exchanges deepened, the political preferences of some voters gradually shifted to the KMT."
On the eve of the 2012 presidential election, many business figures publicly supported then-President Ma Ying-jeou, and some business groups even published newspaper advertisements supporting the "1992 Consensus." The KMT's election narrative at that time linked cross-strait peace and economic development.
Changes in the economic and industrial structure have also prompted the DPP's support base to gradually move to central and southern China. Lin Zonghong pointed out that around 2004, when the Democratic Progressive Party was in power, it promoted social welfare policies such as welfare subsidies for elderly farmers, and the beneficiaries were mainly concentrated in agricultural counties and cities. These measures not only increased the DPP's support in rural areas, but also further consolidated its political foundation in central and southern China.
Regional development gaps have gradually become an important issue in electoral politics. Political scientist Wang Hongen analyzed that the DPP had close relations with social movements and citizen groups in its early years, and has long been concerned about issues such as environmental protection, labor rights, and urban and rural resource allocation. These demands echoed the interests of some relatively underdeveloped areas, allowing the DPP to gradually accumulate political influence in central and southern China and expand its electoral strength in southern counties and cities through cooperation with local factions.
According to Taiwan's official household income and expenditure survey, the average disposable income per household in Taipei City in 2010 reached NT$1.299 million (approximately US$41,300), and that in Hsinchu City was NT$1.185 million, both significantly higher than the Taiwan average of NT$889,000. In comparison, Kaohsiung City, the largest city in the south, has an average of 873,000 yuan, which is similar to the Taiwan average. Yunlin County and Chiayi County, which are mainly agricultural, have only 616,000 yuan and 658,000 yuan respectively.
Wang Hong'en further pointed out that since the 1990s, as Taiwan's identity has gradually increased, some voters have begun to understand regional development and resource allocation issues in the context of national identity.
"Voters in the north believe that the Kuomintang drove Taiwan's economic development after the lifting of martial law, while supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party combine the issue of uneven distribution with Taiwan's national identity. They believe that the DPP attaches great importance to the uneven distribution of resources and can promote Taiwan's identity and the interests of Taiwanese people."
In addition, he also pointed out that Taiwan promoted electoral reform after amending the constitution in 2005, and adopted a "single constituency two-vote system" for legislative elections. This system design is conducive to the development of large political parties and further strengthens the competition between the two major parties, the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party.
Not monolithic
Although "blue in the north and green in the south" has become a common concept to describe Taiwan's political landscape, recent election results have shown that such regional divisions are not static.
Scholar Lin Zonghong said that local elections will still be affected by the momentum of political parties, candidate characteristics and the electoral environment. For example, after the merger of Kaohsiung counties and cities, differences in the original political structure and voter composition added more variables to the results of local elections. In 2018, Kuomintang's Han Kuo-yu was elected mayor of Kaohsiung, which was regarded as an important case of loosening the regional political map.
He pointed out that national political events and domestic and foreign political and economic situations may also affect voters' voting intentions. For example, in the nine-in-one elections held after the Sunflower Movement in 2014, the DPP and its supported candidates won power in 13 counties and cities, and made breakthroughs in Taipei City, Taoyuan City and other places.
Lin Zonghong also believes that the important economic conditions that supported the "blue in the north and green in the south" in the past have changed in recent years. One of the important backgrounds that contributed to the formation of this political landscape was the highly connected economic and trade structure between Taiwan and China; however, as the cross-strait economic and trade environment changes, the influence of these factors on voters' voting behavior is gradually weakening.
Taking the 2020 presidential election as an example, he pointed out that Tsai Ing-wen has gained advantages in many northern constituencies, which shows that with the DPP's basic base and the support of middle voters, the north is no longer a region where the KMT has a guaranteed victory.
After the Democratic Progressive Party returned to power in 2016, the economic and trade relations between Taiwan and China gradually experienced structural changes. The government promotes the "New Southbound Policy" in an attempt to strengthen economic and trade ties with Southeast Asian and South Asian countries. At the same time, the U.S.-China trade war, the reorganization of global supply chains, and U.S. restrictions on China's technology industry have also prompted some Taiwanese businessmen to move funds and production capacity back to Taiwan or diversify into other markets.
According to Taiwan's official statistics, the proportion of goods on the ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement across the Taiwan Straits) Early Collection List of Taiwan's exports to China has dropped from 26.3% in 2016 to 13.1% in 2025; Taiwanese businessmen's investment in China as a proportion of overall foreign investment has dropped from the peak of 83.8% in 2010 to 3.8% in 2025.
median voter
As the traditional blue-green sectors gradually loosen, more and more scholars are turning their focus to the median voter.
Wang Hongen pointed out that even in constituencies that are considered to have obvious political leanings, there is still the possibility of party rotation or "comeback", and such changes have become more common since 2016. One of the reasons is that the proportion of "unaffiliated voters" continues to rise and now accounts for about 30% to 40% of the total electorate. "Some recent polls even show that it is close to 40% to 50%."
He analyzed that from 2008 to 2016, the Kuomintang held both the presidency and the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan; from 2016 to 2024, the Democratic Progressive Party achieved complete governance. As the two major political parties gained full opportunities to govern, some voters began to believe that social problems such as rising housing prices and intergenerational inequality had not improved as expected, and therefore gradually reduced their identification with specific political parties.
"Such a political atmosphere has encouraged the development of independent voters and third force parties, and has also loosened the traditional support base of the two major parties."
Wang Hongen predicts that the flow of nonpartisan voters and intermediate voters will become one of the important observation indicators in this year’s local elections, and may also be a key factor influencing the election results.
He further pointed out that this change is also reflected in the campaign strategy for local elections. Compared with presidential elections, county and mayor elections focus more on local governance and people's livelihood issues. Therefore, candidates usually focus less on political issues such as cross-strait relations, national defense, or reunification and independence. Instead, they focus on policy propositions such as social welfare, childcare, elderly welfare, and local development.
He believes that when the focus of the election shifts from blue-green opposition to specific public policies and governance capabilities, it will be easier to attract voters who have not yet formed a fixed party identity, adding more variables to the election results.
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