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As NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang admitted to having an affair with a woman suspected of being linked to Chinese intelligence agencies, attention is also focused on the so-called 'beauty system', one of China's traditional information operation methods.
On the 8th local time, Jensen Huang sent a message to Nvidia employees, acknowledging his relationship with Chinese businesswoman Alice Huang and apologizing for "being unfaithful to my wife."
Alice Huang is suspected of being linked to Chinese intelligence agencies and is known to be a former executive of Megaspeed, a Singapore-based data center company.
On the same day, Nvidia's board of directors announced that it was launching an independent investigation to determine whether CEO Hwang had been targeted by a foreign intelligence agency.
The beauty world is an information manipulation method that intentionally forms a romantic or sexual relationship with the other person to obtain confidential or sensitive information, or uses the relationship as a weakness to threaten and recruit.
It is also called a 'honey trap' and has the meaning of using the other person's emotions and sexual desires to trap them.
This word was listed in the Oxford Dictionary in 2014, but it is known that this method of operation itself has been used by intelligence agencies in each country for much longer.
In particular, China has been suspected of using a variety of information collection techniques, including spying, for its own benefit overseas, and many countries, including the United States and Europe, continue to be wary of China's intelligence activities.
End of TOP News
China's beauty world, also in Korea?
An incident often mentioned in Korea as an example of suspicion of Chinese beauty circles is the so-called 'Shanghai Consulate General Scandal', which caused a huge social stir.
It was revealed that Deng Xinming, a 33-year-old Chinese woman at the time, had an inappropriate relationship with several Korean diplomats working at the Korean Consulate General in Shanghai, and in the process, contact information of government officials and diplomatic-related materials were leaked.
According to reports in 2011, Deng Xinming was known to have had inappropriate relationships with South Korean diplomats for several years, starting around 2006.
In Mr. Deng's computer files and USB, contact information for about 200 key figures in the Korean government and ruling party, the emergency contact network of the Shanghai Consulate General, data on visa issuance, and personnel-related documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade were discovered. It is reported that some of the materials also contain information requiring external security.
In this case, former consuls from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy were investigated. They were suspected of providing various conveniences to Mr. Deng and passing on internal data.
As the incident spread, the Korean government formed a joint investigation team involving the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ministry of Justice and began an on-site investigation.
However, there were limitations to the investigation, as Mr. Deng was staying in China and could not be interrogated directly because he was a Chinese citizen.
In the end, no specific evidence was confirmed to prove the key issue: whether Mr. Deng approached Korean diplomats under instructions from Chinese intelligence agencies, or whether he formed relationships with them to gain business benefits related to visa issuance.
In the final investigation results, the government joint investigation team concluded that the incident was caused by a serious lapse in public service discipline and poor information management by employees of overseas missions.
In addition, it was revealed that Mr. Deng was also identified as a broker related to visa issuance rather than a professional spy. During the investigation, misconduct by about 10 former and current employees of the Consulate General was confirmed and notified to the relevant agency.
It has never been officially confirmed whether Mr. Deng received instructions from the Chinese intelligence agency, but as it was revealed that sensitive government information could be leaked through personal relationships, this incident served as an opportunity to raise awareness of the security management of overseas embassies and the possibility of information leaks through foreigners.
North Korea's 'beauty world' information operation
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The suspicion that the Chinese intelligence agency carried out a 'honey trap' operation in Korea has not yet been confirmed, but a representative example of an espionage operation against South Korea using beauty circles that has actually been confirmed can be found in North Korea.
In particular, a series of cases were uncovered in which female agents disguised as North Korean defectors approached military officials or public institution workers, formed personal relationships, and accessed internal information through this.
A representative example is the case of North Korean agent Won Won-hwa, who was caught in 2008.
Won Won-hwa is an agent belonging to the North Korean Ministry of State Security and entered South Korea disguised as a North Korean defector in 2001.
Afterwards, he reported himself as a North Korean defector to the National Intelligence Service and continued his public activities, such as giving security lectures at military bases. In the process, it was revealed that he approached decorated officers at military bases in the northern Gyeonggi region, formed relationships, and collected military information.
It was revealed that Won Won-hwa secured about 100 business cards of military officers and delivered them to North Korea, and also collected the locations of military units, officers' personal information, and lists of security instructors who were former North Korean defectors.
Investigating authorities reported that Won Won-hwa had a close relationship with an officer, to the extent that he lived with him, and that he appears to have received orders to lure him to China and recruit him.
Won Won-hwa was indicted and found guilty on charges of violating the National Security Act.
Kim, a North Korean female agent who recruited South Koreans through Internet chatting, is also a representative example of a 'honey trap' operation against South Korea.
Mr. Kim, who was a member of North Korea's State Security Department in 2010, worked as a hotel employee and travel agent in China and approached Koreans through Internet video chat and messenger.
In the process, he formed a close relationship with former Seoul Metro executive Mr. Oh, and was accused of receiving over 300 pages of internal documents, including the Seoul Subway's emergency contact network, emergency response tips, and crew work schedules.
Mr. Oh was indicted on charges of delivering documents to Mr. Kim and was sentenced to three years and six months in prison. After being arrested, Mr. Kim also confessed to the crime and expressed his intention to change his life, resulting in the prosecution's indictment being withheld.
Recently, another case of recruitment through an overseas North Korean restaurant was discovered.
In 2023, Mr. A, the representative of a domestic IT company, visited North Korean restaurants in Myanmar and Laos for about 7 years and became friends with local restaurant officials.
As a result of the police investigation, the vice president of the restaurant that Mr. A contacted was an agent of North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, and Mr. A was suspected of providing him with goods worth 4,800 USD and 20 million won. This also included prescription drugs and narcotics.
The police determined that Mr. A was recruited by North Korea through his relationship with a female waitress at a restaurant, but Mr. A denied the charges of conspiracy, stating that he helped the restaurant because of his romantic relationship with the female waitress.
He was sent to the prosecution without detention on charges of violating the National Security Act and related laws.
Public officials are no longer the only targets... business leaders too
The honey trap is a traditional espionage method that has been used since the Cold War. A representative example is the so-called 'Romeo Spy' operation of the East German State Security Department.
Beginning in the 1950s, East Germany sent male agents to West Germany to gain access to female employees working in government ministries and intelligence agencies.
They established romantic relationships with women using fake identities and occupations, and when trust was built, they handed over confidential documents.
According to data released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in 2018, some of these romantic relationships lasted for years or even decades.
Even today, honey traps are viewed as an espionage method that can be used by foreign intelligence agencies.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) specified honey traps as a separate information collection method in its security guidelines for overseas business travelers.
This means that attractive people can be used to seduce others, and secretly recorded private videos or photos can be used to threaten and damage reputations.
CSIS also said that foreign governments are actually using these methods, and warned people to be wary of intimate approaches or offers to accompany strangers overseas.
MI5, the British intelligence agency, also warns in its security guidelines for politicians and public officials against foreign intelligence agencies forming long-term personal relationships or exploiting individual vulnerabilities to collect information and threaten.
In the past, the main targets of intelligence operations were people with access to state secrets, such as soldiers, diplomats, and government officials, but the controversy surrounding Jensen Huang has highlighted the risk that businessmen can also be targets of foreign intelligence agencies.
In particular, as the competition for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China intensifies, there are concerns that if a businessperson becomes the target of an undercover operation, information directly related to the company's competitiveness, such as core technology or business strategy, may be leaked to the outside.
