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The results of the U.S. midterm elections are out, and the Democratic Party has made a comeback in both houses of Congress. The second half of Republican President Donald Trump's second term will begin in a "lame" state. This election will not only change the power map in Washington, but may also affect the direction of U.S.-China relations and Taiwan issues.
Timing is particularly sensitive. From November 18 to 19, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Summit will be held in Shenzhen; in mid-December, Trump and Xi Jinping may meet again at the G20 Summit in Miami. The US$14 billion arms sales to Taiwan is stuck in Trump's hands. In May this year, he publicly called the arms sales a "very good bargaining chip." After the Democratic Party takes control of Congress, whether there will be a new tug-of-war on export controls, chip restrictions, and the pace of arms sales has become the focus of observation.
Many experts analyzed to BBC Chinese that the two parties in the United States have a deep consensus on China issues. The president is still the policy leader and the general direction will not change due to the change of Congress. The real change lies in the intensity of supervision. The Democratic Party will strictly examine the trade truce reached by Trump and Beijing through hearings, subpoenas, the National Defense Authorization Act and appropriation bills.
At the same time, the resignation of many Republican "Taiwan Connection" legislators who had long supported Taiwan also means that Taipei must re-manage its relationship with the new generation of Democratic legislators.
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"Policies will not change, supervision will become stronger."
Elizabeth Larus, an adjunct researcher at the American think tank Pacific Forum, told BBC Chinese that no matter which party controls the majority in Congress, the United States' support for Taiwan and China policy will not change, and both parties will try to push Trump to approve the $14 billion arms sales to Taiwan on the table.
"Since 1979, every U.S. president has maintained the Taiwan Relations Act, the 'Six Assurances' and the U.S.'s 'One China' policy, and these will not change just because the Democratic Party takes control of Congress," she said.
Bonnie Glaser, Asia Program Director of the German Marshall Fund (GMF), a US think tank, predicts that the Democratic Party will control the appropriation process and the Senate agenda, and is likely to include multiple requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and appropriation bills: accelerated delivery of approved weapons to Taiwan, notification of new foreign military sales (FMS) cases, use of foreign military financing (FMF) for Taiwan, and Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative (Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative) funds. The Six Assurances Act may also gain more momentum.
Glaser also pointed out that after the Democratic Party's victory, the United States may tighten restrictions on China's acquisition of advanced chips, and the Safe Chips Act may be passed. But Trump has veto power, and the Democratic votes are not enough to overturn it, unless some Republican lawmakers switch to support it.
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Dylan Loh, associate professor of public policy and global affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, told BBC Chinese: "There is a broad consensus in the United States on China, and the shaping of the overall relationship is still mainly dominated by the president."
Singaporean independent analyst Tang Mingjie also does not believe that the Democratic Party's victory will bring about a more moderate policy towards China. The two major parties have the same position on export controls, chip restrictions and supply chain measures. The actual change lies in the intensity of supervision: the Democratic Party will strictly examine the trade truce and "constructive strategic stability" framework through hearings and subpoenas.
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Beijing: Look beyond Trump
The core of China's strategy toward Trump in recent years is to "exchange stability with economy and trade and control risks with personal relationships." During his first term, Beijing used trade negotiations and large-scale purchases of U.S. agricultural products in exchange for Trump's relative restraint on Taiwan Strait issues.
Experts believe that in the second term, Beijing went a step further, directly including arms sales to Taiwan in high-level negotiations between the United States and China, and using trade truce, rare earth and supply chain issues as leverage to try to get Trump to "trade" the Taiwan issue.
Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that Taiwan is the "most important issue" and asked the United States to clearly oppose Taiwan's independence at previous summits, while implying that stable relations depend on limiting support for Taiwan. Beijing judged that Trump valued transaction results more than long-term commitments, so it adopted a strategy of "patient pressure and avoidance of head-on conflict", waiting for a window during his term, while preparing for the "post-Trump" period.
As for the midterm elections themselves, Luo Minghui believes that Beijing will naturally pay attention to the results, but will not care too much about who wins and who loses: No matter how the game develops, Zhongnanhai will actively plan and set its strategic sights on the end of Trump's term.
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US$14 billion arms sales case: two summits are key nodes
During Trump’s term, arms sales to Taiwan followed the rhythm of “releasing first and then blocking”. During his first term, he approved multiple arms sales, with a scale and frequency higher than those of his predecessors, covering fighter aircraft, tanks and missile systems, and strengthening high-level military exchanges. In December 2025, he even approved a large-scale arms sales of approximately US$11.1 billion, setting a record.
The turning point occurs in early 2026. A new $14 billion project involving Patriot missiles, radars and command systems for Taiwan's "T-Dome" air defense system has been put on hold for a long time, and Trump continued to delay it after talks with Xi Jinping.
Craig Singleton, a former U.S. diplomat and China program director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), spoke this week
Submission to The New York Times
Warning that delaying arms sales to Taiwan is creating "dangerous misunderstandings" and "putting it on hold today to avoid friction may create conditions for a more dangerous confrontation tomorrow." He believes that for decades, the United States and China have relied on carefully crafted language and strategic ambiguity to deal with the Taiwan issue, but now Xi Jinping may interpret the delay in arms sales as Washington's acknowledgment that "stabilizing U.S.-China relations depends on limiting support for Taiwan." The longer arms sales drag on, the more likely Beijing will view any future push as a betrayal, triggering the very instability Trump is trying to avoid.
In addition to arms sales, cooperation between the United States and Taiwan in intelligence sharing, joint training, asymmetric combat capabilities, and drones continues, but the pace is restricted by negotiations between the White House and Beijing.
As for the first observation point, Deng Mingjie revealed to BBC Chinese that some US officials had earlier stated that the chances of the case being "unpacked" into smaller-scale plans had increased significantly; Ryan Hass of the Brookings Institution also expected that there would be smaller-scale arms sales cases after APEC and the G20.
The National Defense Authorization Act at the end of the year is the second observation point. The Senate version added Taiwan to the war stockpile and included Taiwan in a broader "First Island Chain" initiative covering the Philippines. Deng Mingjie believes that it is worth paying attention to whether these provisions can be retained in the final version.
The third is political rhetoric. Trump said in May this year that he "doesn't want anyone to go independent." If similar statements appear in the written statement of the Shenzhen or Miami summits, it will be a real change.
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"Taiwan Connection" lawmaker loses office, Taipei must rebuild relationship network
In this election, many Republican congressmen from the "Taiwan Connection" were eliminated. These Taiwan-friendly congressmen have long promoted arms sales to Taiwan, strengthened military cooperation, and supervised the executive branch. Members visit Taiwan every year. Instead, they are replaced by many young Democrats who have entered the House of Representatives for the first time. Whether they are familiar with Taiwan and even China affairs is a question mark.
An analysis by the "American Taiwan Observatory", a research community on Taiwan-U.S. relations, pointed out that most of the newly elected members of the new generation rarely pay attention to international issues, or emphasize diplomacy first and reduce military intervention. It is worth watching whether the young "progressives" in the Democratic Party will take a more diversified diplomatic route.
Lan Ruosi reminded another level of contradiction: Trump called for increased spending to rebuild the U.S. Navy to deal with the expansion of the Chinese navy; but the Democratic Party is more concerned about "cream" than "guns." The Democratic-led Congress will prioritize expanding welfare expenditures such as Medicaid and climate policy, thereby compressing the defense budget, making it more difficult to promote military technology investment.
The "American Taiwan Observatory" also analyzed that based on historical experience, previous presidents often turn their focus to overseas affairs in the last few years of their terms. Since April this year, the White House has begun taking stock of immigration, tariffs, housing and other actions that do not require Congress. Trump even calls himself "Mr. Veto." Diplomacy is still mainly dominated by executive power, so even if Trump is "lame", the impact on Taiwan-US relations will be limited.
Zhong Zhidong, an assistant researcher at Taiwan's National Defense and Security Research Institute, made a similar judgment at a conference in Taipei earlier: The current Sino-US relations can be understood as "short-term, long-term, long-term". He emphasized that Taiwan-U.S. relations must be viewed within the overall structure of Sino-U.S. relations. In 1979, even if the United States needed to unite with Beijing to counter the Soviet Union, it did not accept the request to stop arms sales to Taiwan. Today, as China-U.S. strategic competition continues to heat up, the United States has even less room for concessions on this issue. Even if no large-scale arms sales are announced in the short term, it does not mean that the United States is compromising with China on the Taiwan issue.
What changed in the midterm elections was who asked questions in Washington, but the final answer about Taiwan still lies in Trump’s hands. Deng Mingjie emphasized to BBC Chinese that Taiwan's biggest risk lies in the gap in priorities: Beijing puts Taiwan above almost everything, while Trump is dealing with trade, rare earths and other issues at the same time.
Next, Taipei must deal with both the new Congress and the White House. In the context of the ongoing fermentation of "suspicious views on the United States" on the island, different political parties already have different expectations for the United States. The reorganization of power in Washington will only make Taipei's persuasion work more complicated.
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