Photo copyright: Reuters
Two years ago, Donald Trump confidently won the US presidential election. Then the majority of voters voted for him, but now there is no longer any need to talk about such support: Americans are looking for an alternative. This opens the door for Democrats to gain control of one, and possibly both, houses of Congress, which will only add to the president's problems.
On Tuesday, the US holds midterm elections to elect all 435 members of the House of Representatives, a third of senators, governors and members of many state legislatures, as well as many other local officials.
The president will not be elected this cycle. This circumstance significantly reduces turnout: as many years of experience have shown, midterm elections are attended by more politicized and motivated voters, and especially by opponents of the president, eager for revenge for a loss two years ago.
Who has a better chance in this election? What happens if Democrats take control of the House and Senate? What are the prospects for a new impeachment of Trump? Let's look at all these questions in order.
History repeats itself
In presidential elections, turnout is much higher. Most often, voters vote for representatives of the same party for all positions, so along with the presidency, the winning party often receives a majority in Congress. This was the case in 2024, when Republicans gained a majority in both houses, and in 2020, when Democrats controlled Congress.
After two years, the party in power most often loses seats, at least in the House of Representatives, a trend that has been observed throughout virtually all of American history. This often leads to a complete loss of control over the chamber, especially if the advantage was small to begin with. This is exactly what has happened in recent decades, and this fully applies to the two previous midterm elections - 2018 and 2022.
Two rare exceptions occurred more than 20 years ago: in 1998, Democrats under Bill Clinton gained seats in the House of Representatives but remained in the minority, and in 2002, Republicans under George W. Bush strengthened their majority. In both cases, the presidents enjoyed extremely high approval ratings. The connection between a president's popularity and his party's performance in the midterm elections has long been noted by political scientists.
“Pretend I’m on the ballot,” Trump exhorted his supporters to turn out to vote at the Republican convention held in early September, an unusual convention held before a presidential election.
End of Most Popular
This extension will help if you have difficulties accessing the BBC Russian Service website.
Download extension
End of story Chrome browser extension - link
Since the arrival of Donald Trump in politics, in those elections where he was not on the ballot, the Republicans performed truly unsatisfactorily. This experience, of course, is not enough for broad generalizations, but still: they lost the 2018 midterm elections from all points of view, and in 2022 - under the unpopular 79-year-old Democratic President Joe Biden, with high gasoline prices - instead of the promised “red wave” they received a shaky majority in the House of Representatives of a few votes.
Trump turned 80 this year, and his average rating in all polls is 36–37%. Joe Biden in October 2022 and Trump himself had higher ratings in October 2018. As New York Times analyst Nate Cohn notes, this is generally the lowest rating of a president before the midterm elections - at least since the mid-20th century.
Gasoline now averages $4.25 per gallon (3.785 liters), up from $3.80 in October 2022. Not only fuel is expensive: food, electricity and many other important goods and services are becoming more expensive, and this is reflected especially clearly in public opinion polls.
Foreign policy, however, is rarely the focus of midterm elections in the United States unless its consequences directly affect Americans. This time, however, Trump has repeatedly tried to link rising fuel prices not so much with his military campaign against Iran, but with Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Unreliable polls
There are a few caveats when discussing surveys. Sociological surveys, in principle, are not capable of predicting the future: they, with varying degrees of accuracy, reflect the mood of respondents (not the entire society and not all voters) at the time of the survey.
In the American context, this is compounded by the problem of sample representativeness. In the case of online polls, there is a lot of evidence that they are significantly more pro-Democrat. Conducting telephone surveys is becoming more difficult and expensive every year. Many simply do not want to answer calls from unknown numbers: for example, in a New York Times-Siena poll from October 12-19, 3,484 voters took part, and 412,000 calls had to be made to find them.
At the same time, pollsters are not completely confident that a representative sample has been obtained. They try to compensate for biases by giving greater statistical weight to members of underrepresented categories.
The underrepresentation of socially conservative voters without a college degree has repeatedly led to noticeable discrepancies between poll results and election results. The most striking example is Trump's victory in 2016, when polls showed an advantage for Hillary Clinton. But 2020 is also indicative: polls gave Joe Biden a large lead over Trump. Biden eventually won, but not by as large a margin as the polls would have suggested.
Nevertheless, despite all the differences in methodologies, the last poll in which the number of those who approved of President Trump’s activities at least slightly exceeded the number of those who disapproved was conducted at the very beginning of March. In the past, and particularly before the 2024 presidential election, Trump had a strong lead on issues such as the economy and immigration, but even on these issues, most respondents now disapprove of his policies.
Tariff wars with the whole world, especially with its closest neighbors - Canada and Mexico - led to higher prices for imports, and the real war with missiles and bombs with Iran led to an increase in world prices for oil and gasoline in the United States. Polls show that many Republicans, not to mention Democrats and independent voters, are now dissatisfied with foreign wars and the rising cost of living.
House prospects and gerrymandering
Republicans need very little to lose their majority in the House of Representatives: they now have 218 seats versus 214 for Democrats, with several more seats vacant. Immediately after the 2024 elections, the ratio was 220 to 215, with a minimum majority of 218 seats.
Trump tried to avoid losing control of the lower house of Congress by redrawing electoral districts. This is a long-standing phenomenon in American politics, and it has a special name: gerrymandering. It was once an art, but in the era of big data it has become an exact science.
The voter’s place of residence, age, gender, education level, income level, racial and ethnic background, and consumer behavior make it possible to model who this voter will vote for. It is often also known who participated in past elections, and in many cases, party affiliation. Knowing all this, legislators in each state can draw congressional district lines to maximize their party's gains.
Each district must have approximately the same number of residents, but there are few other restrictions on the creativity of legislators in the United States. Democratic legislators could annex a sparsely populated rural area into a major city district - and the voices of conservative farmers would be drowned in a sea of liberal urbanites. A Republican majority in a conservative state could do the opposite—splitting a more liberal big city into narrow strips and incorporating them into vast rural counties. These are still relatively simple techniques - electoral districts can take on the most whimsical forms.
Until recently, however, gerrymandering was practiced after the census, and the census is carried out every 10 years - the last one was in 2020. Last year, Trump flouted that convention and called on Republicans in states where they control the legislature to draw new electoral maps to keep Democrats out of power. In some states, the courts prevented this, but in large states such as Texas and Florida, new maps were drawn. Democrats responded by redrawing the borders in their states, particularly in California.
The nonpartisan think tank Cook Political Report has revised its classification of congressional districts several times this season. By the end of October, he concluded that 218 districts were more or less likely to lean Democratic (with 186 being an absolute certainty). 218 is already a minimal majority. And on top of that, in another 17 districts the result is unpredictable, that is, in some of them the Democrats can actually win.
The same voters may vote for one party in one election and for another in the next. In 2024, Trump and the Republicans won over a record number of Hispanic voters. In the past, they voted en masse for Democrats, but before the last election, Kamala Harris's advantage among this part of the electorate was only seven percentage points.
Now, a huge majority of Hispanic voters are once again backing Democrats—in the aforementioned New York Times-Siena poll (October 12-19), when asked “If the 2026 congressional elections were held today, would you vote for the Democratic candidate in your district or the Republican candidate?” 61% of respondents from this cohort answered that they were Democrats. Republicans built their electoral maps in Texas and Florida on this shaky ground. Where the party's chances had recently seemed absolute, now everything is floating and shaky.
Republicans and their allies with their own campaign funds remain a significant advantage over Democrats in financial resources, and the advertising markets in Texas and Florida are the most expensive in the country. In addition, the Hispanic electorate is heterogeneous - for example, Cubans and Venezuelans, who are especially numerous in Florida, do not trust Democrats and are susceptible to attempts to portray them as “socialists” (and some of them, as discussed later, call themselves socialists).
However, dissatisfaction with Trump and the Republican Party is not limited to the Hispanic electorate. A striking example, but far from the only one, is Kentucky's Sixth District, where Trump won by 15 percentage points in 2024. It is the main center for the production of whiskey-bourbon. Due to Trump's tariff war, which in Canada is perceived as an attack on the country's independence, eight of 10 Canadian provinces have banned the import of American whiskey.
Prospects in the Senate
Senate elections are taking place in 35 states this year. Democrats and their affiliated independents have 47 of the 100 seats in the current Senate. To gain a majority, they need to add four more senators while keeping everyone they have. Even with the current tailwind, both are very ambitious goals.
Democratic Sen. Jon Ossoff is up for re-election this year in Georgia; his position was considered vulnerable at the start of the year, and polling data indicated this at the time, although he has pulled ahead noticeably in recent months. In Minnesota, Michigan, and New Hampshire, incumbent Democratic senators decided to end their careers, so Democrats nominated new candidates. These are all swing states to varying degrees, “purple” states, and Democrats have to fight to keep them. And this is only to retain the existing 47 seats.
Of the new states, Democrats initially had relatively high chances only in North Carolina, where the popular former governor Roy Cooper is running for the Senate. Theoretically, there were also chances in Maine if Republican Susan Collins could be defeated. But she is a very experienced politician and has been elected in this state more than once, despite its slight tilt towards the Democrats.
At first, the Democrats had a charismatic candidate who opposed himself to the party establishment: Graham Platner. But he was dogged by scandals and accusations of sexualized violence, so much so that Platner was forced to end the campaign in July. Instead, the Democrats nominated Troy Jackson, but the outcome of his fight with Collins is assessed by the Cook Political Report as unpredictable.
All other states where elections are being held this year looked not like purple, but like fully red - in Texas, Ohio, Iowa, Alaska, Trump in 2024 was ahead of his rival Kamala Harris by 10 percentage points or more.
Yet in these four states, multiple polls show a Democratic lead. In Texas, Democrat James Talarico has led in nearly every poll since early summer.
The prospect of a blue Texas has turned out to be a mirage for Democrats several times in recent years—in 2016, 2018, and 2020. Still, polls show they have a chance in many Texas counties (despite gerrymandering) and even in the gubernatorial race against familiar Republican Greg Abbott.
And that's not all. Kansas hasn't elected a Democrat to the Senate since 1932 (and rarely did that before either). South Carolina voted for Republican Lindsey Graham four times. But now, based on polls, the prospect of a Democratic victory in these states does not look impossible.
All these are signs of “wave” elections, when a party wins even far beyond its usual territory. The waves were the 2018 midterm elections (then the Democrats won) or the 2010 elections under President Barack Obama - that wave brought supporters of the Tea Party Movement, the ideological predecessors of Trumpism, to Congress.
Left bias
Despite the tantalizing prospects, Democrats face a battle to retain a Senate seat in another battleground state in every election: Michigan. At first, the Democratic establishment viewed these elections with relative calm. But in early August, a candidate named Abdul El-Sayed won the Michigan Senate primary.
El-Sayed is a Muslim of Arab origin, and his political opponents are already trying to use this against him. Michigan has a large Arab community - at least 2% of the state's population, and in the city of Dearborn, with a population of 109 thousand, Arabs are the majority.
In a deeply polarized state, this is an important segment of the electorate that cannot be neglected. But this factor should not be exaggerated. Many Michiganders of Arab descent are socially conservative, and Abdul El-Sayed is running on an openly progressive platform. In this sense, the university's Ann Arbor is no less important to him than Dearborn.
The primaries are a process of ideological cleansing: the most radical and most ideological voters vote there, who do not resemble not only the average American, but even the average voter of their party. They demand from candidates fanatical devotion to ideology and intransigence towards opponents, and politicians who do not meet these criteria are punished by non-election.
This dynamic has been evident in the Republican Party for about ten years: Mitt Romney or Liz Cheney were once authoritative figures, began to criticize Donald Trump, and that was the end of their political careers. But the centrist Democratic establishment is also being attacked, only from the opposite flank.
At the end of last year, despite the resistance of the party leadership, democratic socialist Zohran Mamdani was elected mayor of New York (“Democratic Socialists of America” is a formal organization; Mamdani pays membership dues and undertakes to publicly support its position on all issues). This year, a range of democratic socialists and their ideological allies won the congressional primaries. However, all this happened in deeply Democratic states, where the insurgent candidates had no real danger of losing to the Republicans.
Michigan is another matter. In a swing state where every vote counts, a candidate with a foreign name who constantly talked about genocide in Gaza seemed like an extremely risky choice. And one could come to terms with this if El-Sayed had won the primaries with a crushing score, as it seemed according to the polls. But - and this is another example of the need to treat polls with caution - he ultimately won by less than one percentage point.
Since the primaries, he has softened his stance on many issues, with one notable exception—he remains a harsh critic of Israel. He also ended his collaboration with controversial influencer Hassan Peiker, who is known not only for numerous anti-Israel statements, but also, for example, for statements that America deserved what happened to it on September 11, 2001.
El-Sayed reminds us that he is not a democratic socialist, and formally this is true, although substantively his position differs little from the platform of the Democratic Socialists of America.
El-Sayed has been leading most polls for the past few weeks. This may be helped by the fact that his Republican opponent Mike Rogers supports Donald Trump even in his most unpopular endeavors - until September he defended Trump's decision to go to war with Iran, despite the rise in prices it caused.
Data centers that everyone hates
This election has brought to full attention one completely new issue that worries voters: giant data centers.
At the same time, data centers themselves are by no means a new phenomenon. As Data Center Map, a resource launched in 2007 to provide industry reference information, shows, data centers are everywhere, even in the farthest corners of the planet. It is there that the physical data carriers that humanity generates and stores are installed. For decades they operated, usually in very inconspicuous buildings, and society had virtually no idea of their existence and certainly did not recognize it as a problem.
Data centers can come in all sizes, but in the last few years many giant facilities have been built, primarily for training large language models. In the USA this process is going especially fast.
In 2021 - before the release of the first iteration of ChatGPT - there were about 8 thousand data centers in the world. Five years later - already one and a half times more. More than 5 thousand of them are in the USA. Based on capacity in gigawatts (International Energy Agency data for June 2025), America accounted for 53.73% of the entire world data center industry.
This is only what has already been launched, but the growth rate is accelerating. OpenAI's data center in Abilene, Texas, has become comparable in area to Boeing's main aircraft manufacturing plant in just two years. Meta (declared an “extremist organization” in Russia) is building a Hyperion complex in Louisiana with an area of 15 square kilometers - larger than London Heathrow International Airport, and not the terminals, but the airfield. It is planned to launch between 2032 and 2036.
At the same speed as this infrastructure grew, so did the American attitude toward it. At first, many were happy that the data centers would bring new jobs - this was the industry's emphasis, and employment did increase, as the Brookings Institution think tank who looked into this found out, although less than promised.
But these structures require land: the largest complexes are built in rural areas, but data centers, albeit smaller ones, also occupy urban land.
Stacks of graphics cards consume enormous amounts of electricity, so much so that local power grids are often insufficient. Operators often include the costs of network expansion in household electricity bills - and Americans, as noted above, are already suffering from rising living costs. Large centers build their own power plants, but they burn fossil fuels (usually gas), and this pollutes the atmosphere.
Electronic equipment becomes very hot. To cool it, you need either a lot of fresh water (and there may not be enough of it), or powerful fans, which means 24-hour noise. And those who have a similar structure built in their neighborhood complain that now their property cannot be sold except for next to nothing: in addition to air, water and electromagnetic spectrum pollution, it is also a spoiled landscape: instead of greenery there are concrete boxes, power line supports and fences with barbed wire.
At first, the administrations of all states, regardless of party affiliation, warmly welcomed data center operators (as a rule, these are individual companies, and the AI giants that everyone hears about only rent power from them), gave tax breaks, signed non-disclosure agreements, and issued all the necessary permits with unusual speed. As residents' dissatisfaction grew, they began to harden their position. But since the Republicans won many places in 2024, they are the ones where the discontent hits harder.
A case in point is Ohio State, which has drifted to the right in recent years. J.D. Vance served as Ohio's senator until 2025, when he became vice president. Republican Lieutenant Governor Jon Husted was appointed to replace the senator, who, by the way, was especially diligent in inviting technology companies to the state. Husted wants to confirm his credentials in the elections (Vance was elected in 2022, so there are two more years left on his term), but Sherrod Brown is running for the same seat from the Democrats. He was also a senator for a long time, but lost in the 2024 elections.
There are more than 200 data centers in Ohio. Sherrod Brown constantly opposes their construction and recalls his opponent's role in attracting them. In September, four statewide polls found that an average of about 70% of respondents opposed building such projects near their homes. This trend did not change depending on the party sympathies or place of residence of the respondent. Brown is also leading in the polls; in August, as Axios wrote, this situation was extremely alarming to the National Republican Senatorial Committee, which recommended that Husted change his position on data centers.
Most problems in American life sooner or later become a problem for only one of the two parties. There are almost no gun control supporters left in the Republican Party. There are almost no opponents of abortion in the Democratic Party. The fact that there are opponents of data centers among both Democrats and Republicans may indicate that this problem is still too new and the effect of party polarization has not had time to affect it.
Meanwhile, unlike many Americans, Donald Trump is strongly opposed to any restrictions on the development of AI - in August and September he wrote on his website Truth Social that local residents can refuse data centers only if they want to be “backward and poor,” and calls for slowing down the development of AI models is a “sick conspiracy” that benefits solely China (he later began saying that AI companies should pay local residents “dividends” from their profits, without specifying how this should happen).
Several polls in the last six months have shown that, although there were many opponents of data centers among Republicans (about 40%), there were noticeably fewer than among Democrats (more than half, up to 70%) and independents (45%).
Looking ahead to the midterm elections, Trump's stance is forcing Republican candidates to defend data centers. This could result in them losing some of their voters, who will vote for Democrats this time or simply stay home.
End of Subscribe to our social networks and newsletter
What will happen if the Democrats win?
Commentators and legal scholars have long noted—many with alarm, some with hope—that the importance of Congress has been gradually diminished at the expense of the president. The legislative process in Congress is cumbersome, and the president heads a vast government apparatus that allows him to quickly implement his decisions.
During the first, and even more so, the second term of Donald Trump, this trend manifested itself especially clearly. He was able to effectively paralyze the work of decades-old congressionally created agencies - USAID and the Department of Education - and stopped the work of USAGM, which operated the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe (in Russia declared as "foreign agents") for many months, despite subsequent court decisions that partially limited the administration's actions.
Even if these decisions turn out to be illegal after all the appeals in the courts, this will not threaten the president himself. He initially had immunity from prosecution for almost any action taken as head of state, and in 2024 the conservative majority of Supreme Court justices greatly expanded that immunity.
The Constitution provides for the possibility of impeachment, that is, the early removal of a president from power by Congress. The Democratic majority in Congress has tried to use this tool twice, in 2019 and 2021. One can imagine that similar proposals will be made in the future, but in order not just to initiate impeachment, but to actually remove the president, you need to have a majority of 67 votes in the Senate. Democrats cannot dream of this in this cycle, and in general this bar has never been surpassed in American history.
Nevertheless, a majority in one, and even more so in both houses of Congress will give Democrats some leverage.
The first of these concerns the agenda of the legislature itself. The party that has a majority of even one vote completely controls the entire process of the chamber’s work - it determines the agenda, establishes regulations, occupies all leadership positions and ensures itself a majority of votes in each committee. If Democrats don't like a bill coming out of the administration or passed by the other chamber, they don't even have to put it to a vote—this is fraught with surprises, especially if the majority is shaky. Control over the agenda will allow the consideration of the bill to be delayed indefinitely.
Congress is also an important platform. You can organize investigations into various scandalous situations for the administration, summon key players to committee hearings and interrogate them with passion under cameras. The Republicans will not be able to stop this.
As for the main function of Congress - passing legislation, everything depends on the type of legislation. There are bills that boil down to the management of budget funds (this has been interpreted broadly in recent years, so, for example, Obamacare or economic stimulus projects under Biden were adopted in this way). Such laws require a simple majority in the House and Senate. This is a significant lever of pressure: Democrats can refuse to fund, for example, ICE immigration enforcement and demand significant restrictions on its actions.
If the White House does not agree, then part, and perhaps most of the federal government will be left without funding - this has happened more than once in recent years and is called a “shutdown” (the two longest - 35 and 43 days - occurred in Trump’s first and second terms). Americans will notice that passports are not processed, mortgages are not approved, flight delays and long lines at airports due to the massive absence of air traffic controllers and security officers, and those quite a few Americans who work directly or indirectly for the federal government will acutely feel that they are not being paid.
Photo credit: Bloomberg via Getty Images
In order to pass a law that does not boil down to the distribution of money, you actually need to have more than a simple majority in the Senate - at least 60 votes. This much is needed to complete the debate and move on to voting (a simple majority is enough to pass the law itself). As we have seen, the Democrats will not have sixty votes, which means they will need the support of at least several Republicans. The threat to block a bill by refusing to complete debate (one threat is usually enough) is called a filibuster, and is a powerful weapon in the hands of the Senate minority.
If Democrats manage to take the Senate, they will have one more lever: not to approve the appointments of federal ministers and judges. To do this, it will be enough to have 51 votes. Judges are especially important: They are appointed for life, so they will remain when the current president leaves and will be able to permanently suspend many of the decisions of future administrations. The conservative Federalist Society has spent decades selecting ideologically aligned candidates for judicial positions and then, under Republican administrations, aggressively promoting them to fill every vacancy. If control of the Senate passes to the Democrats, this process will slow down for the next two years.
A hostile Congress can create a lot of inconvenience, but Donald Trump is not the first president to govern under such conditions. Experience shows that he can continue to implement a significant part of his agenda, no matter what.
Download the new BBC World Service app!
When you first open the app, select "BBC News Russian Service" and receive notifications about important news, analysis, videos and podcasts.
Important: The new app is not available in the UK and US.
Find out more
Video playlist
End Video playlist




