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If the government of the Republican President of the United States, Donald Trump, must encounter more robust institutional obstacles to pursue its internal agenda now, the victory of the Democratic Party in the midterm elections, confirmed by the polls, will not change the current White House's stance towards Brazil.
For analysts interviewed by BBC News Brasil, the change in the correlation of forces in American politics will keep intact the tariffs imposed by Trump on national producers, the pressure for the country to move away from China (Brazil's main trading partner since 2009) and get closer to the American sphere of influence, and the classification of the two largest criminal factions — the Comando Vermelho (CV) and the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) — as terrorist organizations, which opened an opening for US military incursions into national territory.
"The more democratic Congress even modifies the capacity for dialogue with Itamaraty, but it will not be able to change Trump's trade policy, precisely where the strongest implications for the relationship between Washington and Brasília are today", assesses economist Otaviano Canuto, former vice-president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), between 2007 and 2009, and former director of the World Bank between the 2000s and 2010s.
Although not all states have finished counting their ballots, the available data already indicates that the Democrats will once again control the House of Representatives — with 237 parliamentarians against 139 on the Republican side, so far — and the Senate, with 54 seats against 44 for Trump's party.
In this case, the definition is still missing in Mississippi and Alaska, where Democrat Mary Peltola is competing vote by vote with Republican Dan Sullivan. As of Wednesday night, 77% of the sections had already been counted, with a difference of 625 votes in favor of the candidate.
These results will change the composition of Congress from January 3, 2027. Today, Republicans have the majority of the Senate (they have 53 seats against 49 for Democrats) and the House (220 against 215). She was the one who had been allowing Trump to govern the country without major political constraints.
Canuto observes that the relationship between the US parliament and the White House is likely to become more conflictive from next year onwards, but that the lack of institutional competences of Congress itself, which does not interfere in foreign policy, will maintain Trump's pressure on Brazil, as well as on other countries.
"There will be more requests for clarification - at first, including about the presence of Flávio Bolsonaro in Florida -, or some bills contrary to the Executive's agenda and even some pressure here and there, but nothing that affects tariffs, for example, which are more serious elements for us", he says, who is also a professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, in the North American capital.
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Lucas Leite, who teaches at Fundação Armando Alvares Penteado (FAAP), is also reticent.
In his assessment, if the Lula government, which has just been re-elected, tends to gain more dialogue in the Democratic Congress, especially on issues where the PT mandate has affinity with party names, such as the environment, this will not be enough to change the way Trump manages his foreign policy.
"He will have more obstacles, especially in Latin America, but the Democratic victory at the polls does not nullify the Trumpist agenda", he observes.
In his view, this will happen not only because the tools that the president has used to create pressure are outside the sphere of action of the Capitol, the seat of the American Legislature, but because Brazil will not be a priority for elected parliamentarians. They must act, rather, to form a more robust opposition to Trump's domestic policies, especially that of deportations, led by the federal agency of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
"It is very possible that the Foreign Relations committees of both Houses will be chaired by Democrats, and that this will lead to more requests for clarification from the State Department, for example", conjectures Regiane Bressan, professor of International Relations at the Federal University of São Paulo (Unifesp).
"This will be the most evident contrast in the new game of forces", he continues.
The State department is managed by Marco Rubio, who has spearheaded some of the most aggressive US actions in Latin America in recent months, such as the arrest of Nicolas Maduro, following a military incursion into Venezuela in January, and the energy embargo on Cuba.
One of those tipped to run in the American presidential election in 2028, Rubio also entered into rhetorical conflicts with Brazil. In July, when new US tariffs were announced on Brazil, for example, he said that Lula "put his ego above" the possibility of a trade agreement with the country.
In recent days, the secretary denied the assumption that the Trump administration helped Flávio Bolsonaro, defeated in the second round of the Brazilian election, to leave Brazil and enter Florida, in the USA.
"There should be more robust action on the State Department, the actor of this pressure, in fact", corroborates Leite, "but I don't see conditions for Congress to reverse the tariffs imposed under Section 301 or even the Magnitsky Act, because they are Executive management mechanisms. They are not simple to change".
He refers to two measures recently applied to Brazil. One, announced in July by the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), imposed a new tax of 25% on a series of Brazilian imports to the country under Section 301 — the section of trade law that came into force in 1974, during the transition between the governments of Republicans Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.
Today, considering the exceptions established by the White House itself, a series of Brazilian products enter the USA upon payment of a tax of 37.5%.
"Congress should not touch this section because, although it has a technical appearance, its use by successive American presidents has always been strictly political. It was designed for the US to pressure and sanction, above all. They will not give up on it", explains Leite.
The other measure he cited was the application of the harshest sanction that Washington has at hand to punish those it considers human rights violators in the world: the Magnitsky Law, created in 2012, during the first term of Democrat Barack Obama, and which restricts financial movements in assets managed by the USA.
In July last year, Trump included Alexandre de Moraes, from the Federal Supreme Court (STF), in this relationship and, months later, added his wife, lawyer Viviane Barcie Moraes.
In December, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the body responsible for enforcing the law, removed both from the list, but the British newspaper Financial Times published a few weeks ago that there is an intention to replace the minister's name soon.
For this reason, Leite believes that the Democrats elected in these midterms should try to reshape Trump's power from below.
"They will seek to review this premise that the president can govern through executive decrees or even try to review the veto power", he points out.
Some experts, such as Carlos Gustavo Poggio, professor at Berea College in Kentucky, USA, argue that the implementation of tariffs through decrees, although based on sections of previous trade laws, was a Trumpist strategy to minimize parliamentarians' room for maneuver.
"Even with a Republican majority, he governs the country practically ignoring Congress. It's not a mandate that will leave a legislative legacy. It looks more like he runs a company," says Poggio, remembering that Trump signed 225 decrees last year and, in 2026, raised that number to 290.
In these cases, it is up to the American Supreme Court to define the constitutionality of decisions, not Congress.
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Even if it were a government priority, the review of import tariffs or the classification of Brazilian criminal factions would hardly have a long lifespan, as it is up to the American president to veto any bill approved in parliament.
To overturn a presidential decision, in turn, a qualified majority of two thirds is required in both Houses. In other words: 290 seats in the Chamber and 67 in the Senate, which, in practice, would require reaching agreements with the Republicans.
More pragmatic readings, in addition, argue that this protectionist stance of the USA in its foreign relations is independent of who is in power in the White House or on Capitol Hill.
This is the perception of political scientist Feliciano de Sá Guimarães, director of the Brazilian Center for International Relations (Cebri) and professor at the Institute of International Relations at the University of São Paulo (IRI-USP), for example. For him, if on the one hand there can be a wider space for negotiations in a game of forces with greater democratic protagonism, on the other hand they will also demand counterparts from Brazil.
"The tariffs and factions are already there. Any change will depend on agreements that, in order to be reached, will depend on what demands the Democrats will put on the table. We would be better able to negotiate [than with Republicans], but a superpower works that way."
This seems to be especially relevant when it comes to protecting basic US industrial sectors, such as steel or aluminum, for example, where Bressan, from Unifesp, notes a consensus in the action of both parties.
In other words, in the case of these tariffs, Democrats and Republicans tend to join hands.
The USA was the fourth largest steel producer in the world in 2025, according to the World Steel Association's annual report: there were 79.5 million tons, behind China (1 billion tons), India (149 million) and Japan (84 million) — but with a drop compared to the 81.5 million tons produced in the previous year.
It is not trivial that, in June, Trump announced a 50% tariff on steel and aluminum imports into the country, in addition to taxing 25% on any products made, for the most part, with these metals.
In the case of aluminum, North America is only the fifth largest producer globally, according to data from the International Aluminum Institute (IAI). The region, which also includes Mexico and Canada, lags behind China, Europe, Asia (without the Chinese) and countries in the Persian Gulf.
The decision was made based on Section 232 of a 1962 trade law created to protect sectors involved in national security. In addition to steel and aluminum, products such as copper and wood, for example, come into its scope.
"Historically, both Democrats and Republicans have tended to be protectionists when it comes to protecting manufacturing sectors that fall under Section 232. That will continue now," she notes
"For this reason, it will not be a bilateral negotiation that will be able to review these tariffs, in particular", continues Lucas Leite, from FAAP.
For analysts interviewed by BBC News Brasil, the Democratic majority in Congress should focus their criticism on the impact of the war in Iran on American inflation, driven by rising oil prices and the cost of living, more than on Trump's tariff agenda, which also contributed to making the US economy more expensive.
In the 12 months up to September, the rise in prices in the US was 3.6%. In May, it reached 4.2%.
"Not to mention that historically the loss of control of the Legislature leads the occasional president to compensate for his internal weakness with stronger political activism abroad", says Bressan.
If this is confirmed, the effect of the Democratic victory will be the opposite of what was expected, with a Donald Trump more incisive in his pressure around the world, as in the case of Brazil.
"It is a possibility, since, on the external agenda, controls are less evident", points out Poggio.
“It’s just a tradition,” says Bressan. "With the agenda blocked by the opposition, the difficulty of approving reforms, American presidents often use international politics as an escape. Let's see if this will be effective now."
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